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A BRIDGE TOO FAR: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS
OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE




Using the framework articulated by Thomas S. Kuhn in his book, The
Structure of Scientific Revolutions, this Article traces the evolution of equity
market regulation in terms of its epistemological foundations and operative
paradigms. It examines the SEC’s growth from a more passive partner with
the securities industry to being an aggressive and perhaps overly intrusive
arbiter of equity market operations. This Article identifies two distinct
paradigms of securities regulation—the “Self-Regulatory Paradigm” and
the “Micro-Intervention Paradigm.” The Self-Regulatory Paradigm and the
Micro-Intervention Paradigm are not compatible, and this Article explains
how the intellectual dissonance between them ultimately allowed the Micro-
Intervention Paradigm to gain acceptance and replace the Self-Regulatory
Paradigm. It then identifies issues with the Micro-Intervention Paradigm
and argues that the adoption of the more interventionist approach it
requires has strained the resources of the SEC, and may now be inhibiting
innovation and improvement in the equity markets.
INTRODUCTION
In January of 2015, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC or
Commission) announced the formation of a new Equity Structure Advisory
Committee (the Committee).1 The stated purpose of the Committee was to
provide a formal mechanism through which the Commission can receive
* The Securities and Exchange Commission, as a matter of policy, disclaims responsibility
for any private publication or statement by any of its employees. The views expressed herein are
those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Commission or of the
author’s colleagues upon the staff of the Commission.
The author is an Associate Director in the Securities and Exchange Commission’s Office of
Compliance Inspections and Examinations. He has previously served as an Assistant Director in
the SEC’s Divisions of Enforcement, and Trading and Markets. He also served as Counsel to the
Acting Chair of the SEC and as Counsel to the Chair of the Commodity Futures Trading
Commission. He is an Adjunct Professor at George Mason University, Antonin Scalia Law
School, teaching securities regulation. The author wishes to acknowledge the contributions of
colleagues who reviewed early drafts of this paper including; Janet Angstadt, J. Bradley Bennett,
Bradley J. Bondi, Professor Onnig H. Dombalagian, Gregory Faragasso, Nina B. Finston, Dr.
Robert Fisher, Constance B. Kiggins, Professor Peter F. Lake, John Malitzis, Eric Noll, Adam
Large, and Michael D. Wheatley. All errors are the author’s.
1. Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Announces Members of New Equity Market
Structure Advisory Committee (Jan. 13, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2015-
5.html; Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Votes to Renew Equity Market Structure
Advisory Committee (Nov. 29, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2016-249.html.
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advice and recommendations specifically related to equity market structure
issues.2 This evaluation of equity market structure provides an opportunity
to analyze the development and application of the Commission’s views on
equity market regulation in the twenty-first century.
This analysis is timely because of the numerous substantive changes to
the capital markets that have occurred in the eighty years since the federal
securities laws were first adopted. The markets of 1934 were largely
centralized, physical locations where individuals could gather to
consummate transactions in securities. Today’s markets do not require
physical locations or even direct human interaction. Computers executing
algorithmic instructions automatically conduct much of modern trading.3
While there have been and continue to be numerous additions to the federal
securities laws, there has not been a wholesale evaluation of the
assumptions underlying the statutes or whether the approach is sufficient to
address twenty-first century market issues. Academic debates about the
appropriate level of financial regulation perhaps miss the larger point that
the framework on which regulation is built may not be adequate for the
markets.4 Indeed, the basic assumption that the Commission always has
been, and must continue to be, deeply involved in the mechanics of the
equity markets may be misplaced.5 In short, I believe the context and
2. The SEC had previously held Roundtables on Market Structure on Oct. 29, 2002. See
Cynthia Glassman, Comm’r, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Roundtable: Market Structure Hearing (Oct.
29, 2002), https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/marketstructure/mkts102902-hrg.txt; see also, Concept
Release on Equity Market Structure, Proposed Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 3594, 3596 (Jan. 21, 2010) (to
be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 242) (conducting “a comprehensive review of equity market structure”
to assess “whether market structure rules have kept pace with, among other things changes in
trading technology practices”).
3. See Andrei A. Kirilenko & Andrew W. Lo, Moore’s Law Versus Murphy’s Law:
Algorithmic Trading and Its Discontents, J. ECON. PERSP., 2013, at 51 (providing an overview of
algorithmic trading arguing that Commission rules are outdated).
4. Compare Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate
Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521 (2005), and Roberta Romano, Does the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
Have a Future?, 26 YALE J. ON REG. 229 (2009), with John C. Coffee Jr., The Political Economy
of Dodd-Frank: Why Financial Reform Tends to Be Frustrated and Systemic Risk Perpetuated, 97
CORNELL L. REV. 1019 (2012).
5. Mary Jo White, Chair, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Remarks Before the SEC Historical
Society, The Continuous Process of Optimizing the Equity Markets (June 2, 2016) (referring to
the SEC’s “equity market structure agenda” as “a priority for the Commission throughout its
history”). Actually, active management of equity market structure did not become a Commission
priority to until the 1970s. See Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Policy Statement, Future Structure of the
Securities Markets, CCH No. 409, 8 (Feb. 4, 1972) [hereinafter 1972 Policy Statement]
(recognizing that the Commission’s call for a central market system was a “shift in the historic
position of the Commission”); see also Arthur Levitt, Chairman, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Opening
Statement on NASD’s Proposed SuperMontage and Streamlining the SEC Review Process for
SRO Filings (Jan. 10, 2001) (“There are features, no doubt, that the Commission would add to or
remove if we were in the business of designing markets—but we are not.”). Equity market
structure is not defined in the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act). For the purposes
of this paper Exchange Act refers to the systems and rules that allow orders for equity securities to
be displayed and executed in public markets and reported to the public.
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common vocabulary needed to have effective policy discussions around the
issues facing equity markets are lacking.
A comparison of the 1934 Packard Phaeton, equipped with a 160
horsepower, 12 cylinder engine, with the 2016 Chevrolet Camaro Coupe,
with a 275 horsepower, 4 cylinder engine, illustrates the amazing increases
in efficiency that are possible with new technological platforms. One can
upgrade the Packard; however, continual changes at different times under
the guidance of different engineers risks the creation of additional
problems. Moreover, the original design of the Packard may cease to
accommodate the latest technologies; at some point a leap to a new design
may be required. In regulatory terms, is it better to continue to add
additional requirements to current statutes (the Packard), or should a
different approach be considered, such as buying the Camaro? In broader
terms, much of modern equities regulation is modeled on the market
operations of the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) as they were in 1934.
Is the system of accretion on existing statutes the appropriate methodology
for twenty-first century markets?
In analyzing the Commission’s approach to equity markets, I borrow
from the epistemological framework created by Thomas S. Kuhn in his
book, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Structure).6 In Structure,
Kuhn argues that science does not develop in a linear progression, with one
discovery logically leading to the next breakthrough. In Kuhn’s view,
normal inquiry proceeds under a widely accepted set of rules or a
“paradigm.”7 The paradigm is applied to whatever puzzles or challenges the
discipline confronts. In the normal course of business, scientists are trained
to apply the paradigm, but not to test or question it. Whether a particular
phenomenon can be explained by employing the paradigm is generally
considered more of a test of the scientist’s ability rather than a test of the
paradigm itself.
In exploring the potential explanatory scope of the paradigm, scientists
obtain results that do not comport with the predictions anticipated by it. As
scientists attempt to explain these anomalies within the existing paradigm,
the dissonance between predicted and actual results leads to a crisis where
the assumptions underlying the paradigm are challenged, questioned, and
deconstructed. During this period, the old and new paradigms continue to
coexist while their respective followers debate the merits of both. When the
new paradigm becomes widely accepted (often when the adherents to the
old paradigm die off), there is a “revolution.” The old views are overturned
and replaced with a new paradigm that better explains and predicts
phenomena in the real world.
6. See generally THOMAS KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (Univ. of
Chi. Press, 4th ed., 2012).
7. Id. at 11.
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Securities regulation is a reflection of the prevailing political,
economic, and social trends of the time in which it was formulated. It is
from these trends that observers formulate the epistemological framework,
or paradigm, used to explain, understand, and regulate capital markets. This
Article traces the evolution of equity market regulation. It examines the
SEC’s growth from a more passive partner with the securities industry to
being a more aggressive and perhaps overly intrusive arbiter of equity
market operations. It identifies the development of two distinct paradigms
of securities regulation. Part I describes the road to federal securities
regulation and the development of both a federal regulatory framework and
an analytical paradigm within that framework. This section concentrates on
the historic antecedents to modern securities legislation and examines the
origins of the federal system of securities regulation.
Part II concentrates on the New Deal legislation that is the basis for the
current regulatory framework. While there were at least six major securities
statutes adopted between 1933 and 1940, this Article concentrates on those
directly relevant to the development of equity markets trading and structure:
the Securities Act of 1933 (Securities Act) and the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 (Exchange Act).8 These two statues established the disclosure
regime, created the Securities and Exchange Commission, and defined the
status, responsibilities, and duties of market professionals and exchanges,
including adopting a model of supervised self-regulation. The founding
paradigm, which I call the “Self-Regulatory Paradigm,” developed and rose
to dominance during this period.
Part III examines the regulatory issues presented by the “paperwork
crisis” of the late 1960s and the resulting stress on the Self-Regulatory
Paradigm. This crisis highlighted anomalies in the Self-Regulatory
Paradigm that allowed for new regulatory approaches to emerge. This
section focuses on the 1975 amendments to the Exchange Act (1975
Amendments) and argues that they represent a change in the role of the
Commission, stressing the parameters of the Self-Regulatory Paradigm
without completely replacing it.9 Using two related SEC actions as
examples, this Article illustrates how the Commission’s use of authority
granted in the 1975 Amendments inaugurated a paradigm shift and the
adoption of a new approach to equity market regulation. Specifically, this
Article analyzes and contrasts the Commission’s 1995 Order of
Investigation against the National Association of Securities Dealers
8. Securities Act of 1933 (Securities Act), Pub. L. No. 73-22, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–77aa (2012)); Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act),
Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78aa–78pp (2012)).
9. This section draws on remarks by Hon. Daniel M Gallagher, former Commissioner of the
SEC. See Daniel M. Gallagher, Comm’r, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Time for a Fresh Look at Equity
Market Structure and Self-Regulation (Oct. 19, 2012),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2012/10/19.
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(NASD) and the Order Handling Rules. Here a new paradigm, which I call
the “Micro-Intervention Paradigm,” developed to compete with the Self-
Regulatory Paradigm.
Part IV explains how the Self-Regulatory and Micro-Intervention
Paradigms are not compatible, and how the intellectual dissonance between
them ultimately allowed the Micro-Intervention Paradigm to gain
acceptance and replace the Self-Regulatory Paradigm. It then identifies
anomalies that have developed in the Micro-Intervention Paradigm.
Specifically, as the Commission committed more and more resources to
regulation of the mechanics of trading, it neglected to examine and update
the system of self-regulation upon which the securities laws were based.
Part V concludes by identifying weaknesses with the Micro-Intervention
Paradigm, arguing that the adoption of the more interventionist approach
has strained the resources of the SEC and may now be inhibiting innovation
and improvement in the equity markets. Finally, this Article suggests the
most important areas of inquiry to develop in seeking a new model for
securities regulation. Specifically, this Article poses the types of questions
that should be answered as part of an evaluation of the most effective path
forward and suggests that it is perhaps time to develop a new paradigm that
is distinct from the traditional approach to securities regulation.
I. DEVELOPING A PARADIGM: PREDECESSORS TO FEDERAL
SECURITIES REGULATION—HUGHES, PUJO, BRANDEIS,
AND PECORA
Federal securities regulation did not spring fully formed from the head
of the New Deal, rather it is part of the larger and more complicated
development of federal administrative law that arguably began at the start
of the republic.10 In general, federal securities regulation is part of a larger
social, political, and economic movement that began in the nineteenth
century. In the so-called “Gilded Age,” the confluence of industrialization,
urbanization, immigration, and unionization required fundamental
rethinking of the appropriate balance between centralized wealth and the
federal government. The Progressive Movement sought to redefine the role
of government to have a role in the regulation of industry. This manifested
itself in early assertions of federal regulatory control over railroads,
including the formation of the Interstate Commerce Commission in 1887
and the passage of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act in 1890. At the same time,
social critics became concerned about the power of concentrated means of
production and the effect it had on quality control and labor affairs. For
example, in 1906 Upton Sinclair published, The Jungle, his exposé on the
10. See Jerry L. Mashaw, Federal Administration and Administrative Law in the Gilded Age,
119 YALE L.J. 1362, 1366 (2010).
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working conditions in Chicago’s stockyards.11 Sinclair was a journalist and
his work is a novel, not an empirical analysis; however, it raised questions
about the sanitary conditions in Chicago meat packing plants. Partially to
assuage public fears over the safety of the public food supply, Congress
immediately convened hearings and President Theodore Roosevelt
commissioned an investigation of the Chicago stockyards. The resulting
report confirmed many of the unsanitary practices alleged by Sinclair and
was transmitted to Congress by the President.12 Congress ultimately passed
the Meat Inspection Act of 1906.13
Securities regulation took a similar, albeit slower path toward
development. The first notable government examination of the operation of
the securities industry in the twentieth century was conducted by the State
of New York. In the wake of the Panic of 1907, Governor Charles Evans
Hughes empaneled a New York State Commission.14 The mandate of the
committee was to determine “. . . what changes, if any, are advisable in the
laws of the State bearing upon speculation in securities and commodities, or
relating to the protection of investors, or with regard to the instrumentalities
and organizations used in dealing in securities and commodities which are
the subject of speculation. . .”15 The resulting Hughes Report identified the
vulnerability of the individual investor to various schemes perpetrated by
investment professionals, including market manipulation and false and
misleading disclosure. It also highlighted the informational advantages
market professionals possessed over individual investors.16 The Hughes
Report identified a basic problem that would continue to vex regulators,
namely the difference between speculation and investing:
It is unquestionable that only a small part of the transactions upon the
exchange is of an investment character; a substantial part may be
characterized as virtually gambling. Yet we are unable to see how the
11. See generally UPTON SINCLAIR, THE JUNGLE (WW. Norton & Co. 2003).
12. See CONDITIONS IN CHICAGO STOCKYARDS, H.R. DOC. NO. 873-59, at 1–3, 9–13 (1906).
13. Federal Meat Inspection Act of 1906, Pub. L. No. 59-242, 34 Stat. 1256 (codified as
amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 601–95 (2012)). Sinclair had meant his novel to be an expose on the
working conditions of immigrant laborers rather than an expose of the food industry. See Karen
Olsson, Welcome to the Jungle, Does Upton Sinclair’s Famous Novel Hold Up?, SLATE (July 10,
2006, 12:57 AM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/arts/books/2006/07/welcome_to_the_jungle.html.
14. Hughes had previously served as counsel to the New York Legislature Joint Committee on
Investigation Life Insurance (Armstrong Committee). The Armstrong Committee produced a ten-
volume report and recommended significant state law reforms in the sale of life insurance. See
JOINT COMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS OF LIFE INSURANCE TESTIMONY TAKEN BEFORE THE JOINT
COMMITTEE OF THE SENATE AND ASSEMBLY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK: TO INVESTIGATE
AND EXAMINE INTO THE BUSINESS AND AFFAIRS OF LIFE INSURANCE COMPANIES DOING
BUSINESS IN THE STATE OFNEWYORK (Brandow Printing Co. 1906).
15. N.Y. STATE LEGISLATURE, REPORT OF GOVERNOR HUGHES COMMITTEE ON
SPECULATION IN SECURITIES AND COMMODITIES 3 (1909) [hereinafter HUGHES REPORT].
16. See id. at 5, 10.
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State could distinguish by law between proper and improper transactions,
since the form and the mechanism used are identical.17
The Hughes Report concluded that many of these abuses could be
remedied by stricter rules and better enforcement by the industry itself,
specifically by the NYSE.18 While eschewing further state regulation of
capital markets, the Hughes Report identified the basic issues and systemic
risks presented by the securities industry, and concluded that regulation at
the state level would have a negative effect on the financial industry based
in New York. The report suggested that the best approach was to promote
different behavior within the industry by the industry itself rather through a
government-sponsored system.19
The stability of the banking system and possible reform was shortly
thereafter examined at the federal level.20 A House committee named for
Congressman Arsene Pujo held hearings that examined the effect of the
concentration and control of money and credit on the financial system. The
work of the Pujo Committee was limited by a lack of subpoena authority
and the then-unsettled issue of congressional authority to either conduct
such inquiries or to require participation from relevant parties. The Pujo
Committee was unsuccessful in obtaining cooperation from the executive
branch, the Senate, or the Courts in settling the basic question of its own
authority.21 It therefore was unable to obtain basic documents, including the
books and records from most of the entities it was investigating.22
Even with its limited ability to obtain evidence, the Pujo Report
identified several areas of market operations that seemed to create
unnecessary risks to the public. Chapter Two of the report focused
17. Id. at 5.
18. See id. at 8.
19. Id. at 4 (“The most fruitful policy will be found in measures which will lessen speculation
by persons not qualified to engage in it. In carrying out such a policy exchanges can accomplish
more than legislatures.”).
20. REPORT OF THE PUJO COMMITTEE APPOINTED PURSUANT TO HOUSE RESOLUTIONS 429
AND 504 TO INVESTIGATE THE CONCENTRATION OF CONTROL, OF MONEY AND CREDIT, H.R.
REP. NO. 1593-62 Appendix A and B, 175–79 (1913) [hereinafter PUJOREPORT].
21. Id. at 16 (“It is thus seen that the refusal of aid by the controller, the failure of the Senate to
pass the bill amending 5241 of the Revised Statutes, the lack of any authoritative decision by the
courts sustaining its right to obtain access to the books of the national banks have seriously
embarrassed your committee in its efforts to present complete disclosure of the extent , if any, to
which the resources of the lending national banks in the cities of New York, Boston and Chicago
have been or are being exploited in the interest of banking houses and others with which they are
affiliates through stock holdings, joint account, promotion, syndicate and other financial relations
and transactions.”); see also MARY A. O’SULLIVAN, DIVIDENDS OF DEVELOPMENT,
SECURITIES MARKETS IN THE HISTORY OF U.S. CAPITALISM 1865–1922 (Oxford Univ. Press
2016) (discussing late nineteenth and early twentieth century markets, Chapter 7 examines the
Pujo Committee).
22. “Most of the State institutions and the principal national banks in the reserve cities of New
York, Philadelphia, Boston, and St Louis refused or omitted to make any return whatever and
denied the power or jurisdiction of the committee to inquire into their affairs.” PUJO REPORT,
supra note 20, at 14.
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completely on the operation of the NYSE and noted several questionable
activities, including: anti-competitive practices against rival exchanges, the
maintenance of an engraving monopoly for the securities of listed
companies, undisclosed hypothecation of customer securities,
“unwholesome speculation,” manipulation, and short selling.23 Speculation,
and the difficulty in defining it, was a major focus of the 1909 Hughes
Commission, and the Pujo Committee drew heavily on the former’s work.
Notably, the Pujo Committee did not identify any illegal activity; rather it
documented the negative effects of the concentration of capital and credit in
too few institutions, with resulting unfairness in capital markets.24
This theme was developed further in popular culture. In 1913, Louis
Brandeis, known as “the people’s attorney,” published a series of articles
that challenged the operation of America’s financial system. These articles
were collected in the book, Other People’s Money and How the Bankers
Use It, published in 1914. He documented instances where large banking
institutions, acting in collusion with major industries, created trusts that
controlled those industries and manipulated the value of companies, free of
market forces. This, Brandeis argued, inhibited innovation, competition,
and efficient operation of the capital markets. The book described the
interlocking relationships between commercial and investment banking, and
warned of the risk that unchecked capitalism in the United States was
leading to financial oligarchy.25 Brandeis was particularly critical of the
relationships between commercial banking and investment banking
functions, noting:
These large profits from promotions, underwritings and security purchases
led to a revolutionary change in the conduct of our leading banking
institutions. It was obvious that control by the investment bankers of the
deposits in banks and trust companies was an essential element in their
securing these huge profits. And the bank officers naturally asked, “Why
then should not the banks and trust companies share in so profitable a
field? Why should not they themselves become investment bankers too,
with all the new functions incident to ‘Big Business’?” To do so would
involve a departure from the legitimate sphere of the banking business,
23. Id. at 42–52.
24. “They have not taken the position that there is a Money Trust such as would be unlawful
under the Sherman law. They have contended, however, that there was a dangerous concentration
of money and credits in the hands of a few men of great power in the financial world, which, in
fact, amounted to a trust or monopoly.” Say Money Trust is Now Exposed, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 12,
1913), http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive-free/pdf?_r=2&res=9F00E2DB163FE633A25751C
1A9679C946296D6CF.
25. LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY: AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT 26–27
(Martino Pub., Mansfield Centre, CT, 2009). Louis D. Brandeis was a noted progressive lawyer in
the early Twentieth Century. He was appointed to the Supreme Court in 1916. The book was a
collection of essays that Brandeis published in Harpers Weekly between November 1913 and
January 1914. For a complete biography of Louis D. Brandeis, see generally MELVIN UROFSY,
LOUISD. BRANDEIS: A LIFE (Pantheon Books, 2009).
2017] Approach to Equity Market Regulation 293
which is the making of temporary loans to business concerns. But the
temptation was irresistible. The invasion of the investment banker into the
banks’ field of operation was followed by a counter invasion by the banks
into the realm of the investment banker.26
Brandeis also seized upon the discussion of capital concentration from the
Pujo Report, expressly recognizing the role of public opinion in seeking
reforms:
Publicity is justly commended as a remedy for social and industrial
diseases. Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants; electric light the
most efficient policeman. And publicity has already played an important
part in the struggle against the Money Trust. The Pujo Committee has, in
the disclosure of the facts concerning financial concentration, made a most
important contribution toward attainment of the New Freedom. The
battlefield has been surveyed and charted. The hostile forces have been
located, counted and appraised.27
Brandeis clearly identifies the concentration of capital and resulting
behavior as issues to be addressed.28 What is missing from Brandeis’s
argument is empirical evidence or economic analysis supporting his views.
As with the Hughes and Pujo Committees, he did not expose illegal
activity, so much as activity that seemed unfair. Unlike Sinclair’s The
Jungle, Brandeis’s book did not lead to federal action with regard to the
securities laws generally. It did, however, temper the thinking of many of
the people who would later draft the New Deal. The lack of federal
regulation was filled by state “Blue Sky” laws, which regulated the sale and
distribution of securities in specific states. These varied from state to state
and have been generally described as antifraud laws or licensing laws.29
Both the Hughes and Pujo Committees took pains to explain the
operation of the marketplace and the risks that could follow from
unregulated operation. Notable themes from both were the use of leverage
and non-public information by market participants, and manipulation by
market professionals. Also, both reports heavily criticized the operation of
the NYSE, the then-dominant securities exchange in the United States.
These criticisms defined the major themes of the regulatory debate and
would shape the arguments in favor of more federal regulation. Specifically,
26. BRANDEIS, supra note 25, at 26.
27. Id. at 92.
28. The issue of large concentrations of capital continues to the present time. For a modern
analog consider the formation of the Financial Stability Oversight Council Board and its attempts
to designate systemically important financial institutions. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank), Pub. L. No. 111-203, §§ 111–12, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010)
(codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 5321–5322 (2012)).
29. See MICHAEL E. PARRISH, SECURITIES REGULATION DURING THE NEW DEAL 6–12 (Yale
Univ. Press 1970); see also Elisabeth Keller, Introductory Comment: A Historical Introduction to
the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 329, 329–52
(1988).
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as discussed later, conflict between the NYSE and the government has
played a large role in the development of the regulatory paradigm well into
the twenty-first century.
The next crisis, and the straw that broke the camel’s back, was the
market crash of 1929 and the subsequent financial turmoil that culminated
in the Great Depression. In April of 1932, the Senate Committee on
Banking and Currency began an investigation of stock exchange practices.
The Committee’s mandate was:
(1) To make a thorough and complete investigation of the practices with
respect to the buying and selling and the borrowing and lending of listed
securities upon the various stock exchanges, the values of such securities,
and the effect of such practices upon interstate and foreign commerce,
upon the operation of the national banking system and the Federal Reserve
system, and upon the market for securities of the United States
Government, and the desirability of the exercise of the taxing power of the
United States with respect to any such securities; and (2) to report to the
Senate as soon as practicable the results of such investigation and, if in its
judgment such practices should be regulated, to submit with such report its
recommendations for the necessary remedial legislation.30
While this has commonly been referred to as the Pecora Committee, it
was in fact a Senate Committee empaneled under a Republican President.31
The Committee was authorized to examine stock exchange practices, which
had been a major topic of both the Hughes and Pujo Reports. Its mandate
was limited to listed securities—that is, securities listed and traded on a
stock exchange.32 The early hearings, conducted first by Claude Branch and
later by William Gray, counsel for the Committee, were limited by the
scope of the Committee’s mandate as well as witness obfuscation and
avoidance. In one case, a witness, M.J. Meehan, claimed illness and
travelled to Europe to avoid testifying.33 Similarly, Counsel Gray was
reminded by the Committee members about the scope of the Committee’s
30. A Resolution to Thoroughly Investigate Practices of Stock Exchanges With Respect to The
Buying and Selling and The Borrowing and Lending of Listed Securities The Values of Such
Securities And The Effects Of Such Practices: Hearings On S. Res. 84 Before the S. Comm. on
Banking & Currency, 72d Cong. 1 (1932) [hereinafter Hearings Part 1].
31. FDR Timeline, FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY & MUSEUM,
http://www.fdrlibrary.marist.edu/archives/resources/timeline.html (last visited Feb. 22, 2017) (The
hearings began in April of 1932 under the Hoover Administration.).
32. Securities can be either listed on a registered exchange (“listed securities”) or be traded off
exchange, in the over-the-the counter or broker-to-broker market (“OTC securities”).
33. A Resolution to Thoroughly Investigate Practices of Stock Exchanges With Respect to The
Buying and Selling and The Borrowing and Lending of Listed Securities The Values of Such
Securities And The Effects Of Such Practices: Hearing on S. 84 Before the S. Comm. on Banking
& Currency, 72d Cong. 529 (1932) [hereinafter Hearings Part 2].
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work and encouraged not to veer too far off of the subject.34 The activity of
the Committee was not without its partisan infighting.35
The Committee had been hearing evidence for ten months, and had
conducted hearings and taken testimony from numerous witnesses, prior to
the appointment of Ferdinand Pecora as counsel in January 1933.36 In April
and June of 1933, the mandate of the inquiry was substantially expanded to
include virtually all areas of securities offerings, sales, underwriting, and
financing.37 Unlike the Hughes or Pujo Committees, the Pecora Committee
had subpoena power and could require the production of documents and
testimony under oath. Generally, commentators believed that the inquiry,
while not without issues, was well prepared. One contemporary commenter
noted:
The inquiries conducted by the Senate Committee on Banking and
Currency, while occasionally without dignity and frequently given
publicity in such a way as to amount to extreme unfairness to the interests
being investigated, set a new standard for thoroughness of preliminary
preparation. This was especially true after Mr. Pecora became the
Committee’s Counsel. 38
While the Pecora Committee’s findings are often cited as the
foundation of modern securities regulation, it is worth noting that the major
statutes that would define federal regulation of securities and banking were
all passed prior to the completion of the investigation and the issuance of a
final report. Thus, the Banking Act of 1933 (Glass-Steagall) (enacted June
16, 1933), the Securities Act (enacted May 27, 1933), and the Exchange
34. Id. at 436 (noting Mr. Gray was not able to illicit complete testimony due to instructions
from the Chairman to limit time); id. at 645 (discussing relevance of certain securities and
acknowledgement by the Chairman that Counsel has requested more time to prepare).
35. Id. at 714.
Senator Glass: Is there any other official of General Motors Co. from whom kindred
information can be secured that you have subpoenaed?
Mr. Gray: Not that I have subpoenaed. There are some other accounts that I have
investigated.
Senator Glass: I ask that question because it has been whispered for weeks around the
Capitol that this investigation was initiated with the expectation of involving several
prominent Democrats, and I want to elicit information from you as to whether you
equally want to involve several prominent Republicans.
Id.
36. Pecora was retained as counsel on January 24, 1933. S. REP. NO. 1455, at 2 (1955). He was
appointed after the elections of 1932 and prior to the inauguration of President Roosevelt on
March 4, 1933.
37. Id. at 2.
38. John Hanna, The Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 23 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 23 (1934).
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Act (enacted June 6, 1934) were all proposed, debated, and passed prior to
the completion of the Pecora Committee’s inquiry. 39
The Pecora Committee neither explained the 1929 crash nor tied it to
the wider financial instability that that led to the Great Depression. The
relationship, if any, between the two events is the subject of debate.40
Rather, the hearings provided a forum to, as Brandeis might have put it,
“publicize” the business practices and operations of securities firms and
banking entities. Much as Brandeis had attempted to shame bankers in his
book, Pecora used the hearings to expose practices that were unfair or
offensive, many of which were legal practices that seemed to be immoral,
unethical, or unfair to public users of the securities markets and banking
system.
For example, the final report of the Committee (Pecora Report)
identified numerous troublesome business practices engaged in by
commercial banks, including: the operation of manipulative stock pools,
insider trading, offering profitable securities to “preferred lists” of clients
(usually those with ties to industry or government), avoiding the federal
prohibition against trading in securities by operating state-chartered
securities firms, funneling bank clients to the securities affiliates, and
offering securities without full disclosure.41 Similarly, the regular practices
of brokers and stock exchanges were explicated. The Pecora Committee
heard testimony on pooling arrangements, manipulation, and abuse of
customer stop loss orders.42 As later commenters have observed, none of the
securities lending practices are directly linked to the numerous failures of
commercial banks during that era.43
39. Banking Act of 1933 (Glass-Steagall), 12 U.S.C. § 227 (2012); see generally Securities
Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a– 77aa (2012); Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78pp (2012).
40. George D. Green, The Economic Impact of the Stock Market Boom and Crash of 1929, in,
CONSUMER SPENDING AND MONETARY POLICY: THE LINKAGES 189, 190 (The Federal Reserve
Bank of Boston, Monetary Conference June, 1971).
41. See S. REP. NO. 1455, at 30, 109, 211, 301.
42. Hearings Part 2, supra note 33, at 385–406 (testimony of Edward Knight, accountant).
43. GEORGE J. BENSTON, THE SEPARATION OF COMMERCIAL AND INVESTMENT BANKING:
THE GLASS-STEAGALL ACT REVISITED AND RECONSIDERED 27 (Oxford Univ. Press, 1990).
However, there was testimony indicating that banks engaging in securities activity did not have
sufficient internal controls to manage exposure to the risk of securities affiliates. The exposure to
securities loans was substantial and was recognized by industry participants. For example, in
arguing against short sale regulation Richard Whitney, President of the NYSE, testified:
We have some five billions to six billions of loans held by our banks throughout this
country on collateral security listed on the New York Stock Exchange. If the stock
exchange did not have a liquid market, if that market was closed, as would, in my
opinion happen with the prohibition of short selling, those five to six billion of
collateral loans would be frozen, and the gravity of the effect on our banking situation I
do not think can be estimated.
Hearings Part 1, supra note 30, at 29 (testimony of Richard Whitney, President, New York Stock
Exchange).
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The Pecora Report produced an almost endless parade of characters and
testimony that seemed to confirm what many Americans had suspected—
that Wall Street operators had an insurmountable advantage with regard to
the control of capital, the availability of useful information about issuers,
access to the means of profiting on that information, as well as a penchant
to use those advantages for personal gain. In some instances, those
advantages, such as using securities sales to generate losses for tax
purposes, were only tangentially related to the regulation of securities, but
still made excellent copy for the media.44
The bankers, traders, and exchanges that were excoriated by the Pecora
Committee were doing nothing more than, quite rationally, responding to
the incentives that were inherent in the system. In other words, they were
using superior information and access to capital to maximize the returns on
their investments. However, they were doing so by using their role as
market participants to profit at the expense of others, some of who were
ostensibly their customers. Their use of information asymmetries caused the
nation to question whether or not economic incentives, rather than ethics
and responsibilities, should control the operation of the capital markets.
Much of the public outrage at these practices came from moral objections
and associated lack of perceived fairness. In many ways it echoed the moral
outrage of Brandeis in Other People’s Money and How the Bankers Use It.
While these issues are often cast in terms of fairness or legality, what they
really illustrate is how much information asymmetry distorted the ability of
the markets to effectively allocate capital.
The Pecora Report was deeply influential on the development of federal
securities regulation. As James Landis, a drafter of the Securities Act,
described the Committee’s impact:
That Committee spread on the record more than the peccadillos of groups
of men involved in the issuance and marketing of securities. It indicted a
system as a whole that had failed miserably in imposing those essential
fiduciary standards that should govern persons whose function it was to
handle other people’s money. Investment bankers, brokers and dealers,
corporate directors, accountants, all found themselves the object of
criticism so severe that the American public lost much of its faith in
professions that had theretofore been regarded with a respect that had
approached awe.45
Armed with the Pecora Committee’s findings, encouraged by public
opinion, and enjoying political support from both houses of Congress,
FDR’s administration sought to redefine the role of the federal government
in the oversight of the financial industry. The drafters of major New Deal
44. S. REP. NO. 1455, at 321–33.
45. James Landis, The Legislative History of the Securities Act of 1933, 28 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 29, 30 (1959-1960).
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securities legislation shared much of the motivation of their precursors in
the Progressive Era46 many of the drafters of the Securities Act and the
Exchange Act were directly associated with figures in the Progressive
movement. For example, Felix Frankfurter, part of Roosevelt’s “Brain
Trust,” had a long professional relationship with Brandeis.47 Frankfurter
recruited the primary drafters of the Securities Act and the Exchange Act—
James M. Landis, Benjamin Cohen, and Thomas G. “Tommy the Cork”
Corcoran.48 Landis had clerked for Justice Brandeis, Corcoran for Justice
Oliver Wendell Holmes, and Cohen for Judge Learned Hand, all of who
had links to the nineteenth-century Progressive movement.49 The worldview
associated with this group has been described as follows:
A belief that the present was not like the past, and that the future would
not resemble the present, defined the sensibilities of Americans who were
acutely self-conscious about living in the modern age. From the late
nineteenth century onwards, the rise of new technologies, new institutional
forms such as the corporation and the modern factory, unprecedented
possibilities offered by mass production, and the proliferation of new
economic and social relationships engendered by these developments both
promised and threatened to overturn completely past assumptions about
the economic foundations of American society.50
In a period of six years they produced the statutes that would define
federal securities regulation in the twentieth century: the Securities Act, the
Exchange Act, the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, the
Maloney Act of 1938, the Trust Indenture Act of 1939, the Investment
Advisers Act of 1940, and the Investment Company Act of 1940.51 These
statutes and the drafters’ epistemological framework set the stage for the
development of the original paradigm of federal securities regulation.
II. THE FRAMEWORK OF FEDERAL SECURITIES
REGULATION: THE SELF-REGULATORY PARADIGM
The original analytical framework for the federal securities laws can be
described as the Self-Regulatory Paradigm. It developed as a progressive
46. Jessica Wang, Neo-Brandeisianism and the New Deal: Adolf A. Berle, Jr., William O.
Douglas, and the Problem of Corporate Finance in the 1930s, 33 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1221, 1231
(2009-2010).
47. David W. Levy & Bruce Allen Murphy, Preserving the Progressive Spirit in a
Conservative Time: The Joint Reform Efforts of Justice Brandeis and Professor Frankfurter,
1916-1933, 78 MICH. L. REV. 1252, 1260 (1980).
48. Landis, supra note 45, at 36.
49. This is not an analysis of the progressive movement; rather I use the period to illustrate
how the New Dealers were influenced by the thinkers of the prior century.
50. Wang, supra note 46, at 1242.
51. Public Utility Holding Company Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 79–79z (2012); Maloney Act, 15
U.S.C. § 78o (2012); Trust Indenture Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77aaa–77bbb (2012); Investment Advisers
Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1-80b-21 (2012); Investment Company Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1-
80a-64 (2012).
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yet moderate approach to federal intervention in the securities markets.
While all seven of the above statutes share this underlying framework, this
section focuses on the statues most relevant to equity market structure: the
Securities Act, the Exchange Act, and the Maloney Act. Using these
examples, I will explain the development of the paradigm.
A. THE SECURITIESACT: DISCLOSURE, TRANSPARENCY, AND
SUNLIGHT
The New Deal built on Brandeis’ call for transparency and structured a
system requiring full disclosure. The Securities Act instituted a system of
mandatory registration and disclosure for companies issuing new
securities.52 Initially, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) oversaw this
system. The new disclosure requirements built upon standards that had been
instituted by the NYSE, which required that companies seeking to have
securities listed on the exchange file annual reports. Perhaps seeking to
avoid federal intervention, the NYSE tightened those standards after the
crash of 1929.53
Specifically, the statute required the issuers to provide detailed financial
information and required that information to be certified by an independent
accountant. Rather than requiring the government to pass on the merit of
any given issuance of securities, professionals associated with the industry
were required to examine and certify the financial disclosures for
completeness and accuracy. 54
The drafters of the legislation changed the incentives for the financial
community. Up to this point the incentives in the financial industry had
been skewed toward taking risk and using information for personal gain.
This, in turn, resulted in a prevailing perception that the system was unfair
to most investors. Under the Securities Act, the industry participants had a
strong incentive to ensure the accuracy of disclosures in order to avoid
liability and to maintain professional standing in the financial community.
In other words, professionals such as accountants and lawyers were given a
special status in the process, because no company could register an offer or
sale of securities without their involvement. At the same time, industry
professionals were incorporated into the regulatory system because they
faced liability if the company’s disclosures were subsequently found to be
materially false. Liability could be avoided if professionals such as
accountants, lawyers, and underwriters conducted a reasonable inquiry of
the offerings. In short, the government enlisted the industry in the process
52. Securities Act, §§ 6–7, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77f–77g.
53. John Hanna, The Securities Exchange Act as Supplementary of the Securities Act, 4 L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 256, 258 (1937).
54. Securities Act, § 11, 15 U.S.C. § 77k; see, also Regulation S-X, 17 C.F.R. § 210.2-02
(2011) (accountant’s reports and attestation reports); Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229.308(b)
(2011) (accountant’s attestation of internal controls over financial reporting).
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of improving the flow of information to investors and made market
professionals “gatekeepers” to the capital markets.55 This innovative
approach would be expanded upon in the next piece of New Deal
legislation, the Exchange Act.
B. THE EXCHANGEACT: ONGOINGDISCLOSURE AND SECONDARY
MARKET TRADING
The momentum created by FDR’s election and his first “100 days” had
ebbed and business leaders were concerned that any additional financial
regulation would have a negative impact on recovery. After that flurry of
initial activity, the industry regrouped and began to oppose further federal
intervention. The Exchange Act met serious opposition from business and
the financial services industry. In particular, there was new skepticism
toward certain customer protection portions of the legislation, especially
with regard to limitations on securities lending.56
The Exchange Act supplemented the disclosure requirements of the
Securities Act by adding the requirement of periodic reporting.57 It also
created the SEC and defined a regulatory framework for all secondary
market securities trading. More particularly, the Exchange Act defined the
roles of market participants, such as broker-dealers and exchanges, and
55. JOHN COFFEE, GATEKEEPERS THE PROFESSIONS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 2–3
(Oxford Univ. Press 2006).
56. An example can be seen in this colloquy between Corcoran and Senator Kean:
Senator Kean: One of the reasons is that there has been testimony here as to billions of
dollars or hundreds of millions of dollars loaned on the stock exchange, and that they
did not lose 1 cent.
Mr. Corcoran: That is, the broker didn’t lose, nor the bank that loaned didn’t lose. But
how about the fellow that bought stocks on margin? He did lose.
Senator Kean: Yes.
Mr. Corcoran: I do not think we need legislation particularly to protect the broker all
the time. They normally won’t lose.
Senator Kean: I do not know. If you get a narrow market, they might lose. The liquidity
of the market is what they loaned money on.
Mr. Corcoran: What you are talking about, Senator, is the social desirability of
accepting all the perils that have been perfectly evident to us over the last 5 years of
excess of borrowed money in the market. You are balancing those perils against the
advisability of having quotations that will run an eighth or a quarter of a point instead
of 2 or 3 points.
Senator Kean: What I am saying is this, that the money market in New York has been
of continuous benefit to protect banks and dealers.
Stock Exchange Practices, Hearings Before the S. Comm. on Banking & Currency, 73d Cong.
6421–7409, 6498 (1934) [hereinafter Stock Exchange Practices].
57. Exchange Act § 13, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (periodical and other reports).
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required them to register with the newly formed SEC.58 Registration, in
turn, required that they comply with the rules and regulations that the new
Commission would promulgate—for example, requiring them to keep
detailed books and records.59
Building on the paradigmatic concept of industry participation in
regulation, the Commission gave the existing exchanges the status of
regulators. It required them to register but granted them broad authority to
set standards for membership and police the activities of their members.
The structure was modeled to comport with the business models of the
existing exchanges, but the over-the-counter market, which was not
centralized, presented additional challenges.60 Of the thirty-four stock
exchanges examined in the Pecora Report, the NYSE was the most
dominant.61 Most of the other exchanges in existence in 1934 have since
disappeared or merged, and the NYSE has drastically changed its form..
More than eighty years later, it is no longer a floor-based trading center
with a membership structure, but an almost exclusively electronic trading
center owned by a multinational, publicly-traded company.62 It is no longer
the dominant or even primary equities exchange in the United States. In
other words, the exchange registration process was designed for a Packard,
while today exchanges operate more like Camaros.
C. THEMALONEYACT: THEOVER-THE-COUNTERMARKET
Prior to the passage of the Maloney Act, the Investment Bankers
Association (IBA) played a key role in the supervision of the over-the-
counter securities markets.63 Founded in 1912 with a mandate to provide a
voluntary code for industry participants, the IBA described its mission as
follows:
The object of this Association being to improve the methods of
distributing securities, the Committee believes that its duty is to develop a
system of comprehensive publicity which will advance the interest of the
58. See id. § 6 (registration of exchanges); id. § 15 (registration of broker-dealers).
59. Id. § 17 (record keeping requirements for exchanges and broker dealers).
60. Stock Exchange Practices, supra note 56, at 6496. “There is a provision in this bill which
empowers the Federal Trade Commission to regulate the over-the-counter market. Just exactly
how you are going to regulate that market, no one has yet worked out.” Id. (emphasis added)
(statement of Thomas G. Corcoran, Counsel, Reconstruction Finance Corp.).
61. “A comparison of the returns filed by these exchanges establishes the New York Stock
Exchange dominates the securities business in every respect.” S. REP. NO. 1455, at 8 (1935).
62. The New York Stock Exchange and it related markets are subsidiaries of the
Intercontinental Exchange Inc. See Press Release, Intercontinental Exchange, Intercontinental
Exchange Reports Fourth Quarter 2016 GAAP Diluted ESP of $0.59 on Revenues of $1.1 Billion;
Fourth Quarter 2016 Adjusted Diluted ESP of $0.71, + 9% Y/Y (Feb 7, 2017).
63. PARRISH, supra note 29, at 17–41.
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members of this Association and tend to protect the investors of the United
States and foreign investors in American Securities.64
In 1934, the IBA presented its Code of Fair Conduct for Investment
Bankers (Code) to the National Recovery Administration (NRA).65 The
NRA, another product of the New Deal, was authorized by the National
Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA), which sought to stabilize prices and
encourage codes of conduct and fair competition in industries.66 This
attempt to give industry codes in the over-the-counter securities market the
force of law failed when the Supreme Court declared the NIRA
unconstitutional.67 With the enacting statute deemed unconstitutional, the
Code was no longer enforceable under federal law.
After the Court’s decision was announced, the SEC, with James
Landis taking the lead, encouraged the IBA to continue to develop the
Code.68 This continued the approach, started in the Securities Act, of
allowing industry a seat at the table and giving it the opportunity to shape
the regulatory structure the government would adopt. As Landis put it:
Just as the disciplinary committees of the exchanges have been invaluable
to us in our effort to supervise the activities on the exchanges, similar
machinery would seem to be of value for the over-the-counter markets.
Under a self-imposed discipline it is frequently possible to lift standards . .
. to a point beyond that possible through legislation and regulation.69
At the same time, the Landis approach is a modification of the Brandeis
formula of direct government intervention.70 It is a pragmatic approach that
recognizes that intense government regulation would be extremely
expensive and could be counterproductive given the risk of overregulation.
As an alternative to expanding the capacity of the SEC to police the over-
the-counter securities market, Congress created a new classification of
regulators, called Registered Securities Associations.71 Building on the
Code created by the IBA, the Maloney Act established a system of
regulation among brokers, dealers, underwriters, and investment bankers
operating in the over-the-counter market for securities, comparable to that
64. H.R. REP. NO. 96-746, pt. 2, at 156 (1963).
65. See generally INV. BANKERS CODE COMM., CODE OF FAIR COMPETITION FOR
INVESTMENT BANKERS (1934).
66. National Industrial Recovery Act, H.R. 5755, 73rd Cong. (1933); Enrolled Acts and
Resolutions of Congress, 1789-1996; General Records of the United States Government; Record
Group 11, National Archives.
67. United States v. Schechter, 8 F. Supp. 136 (E.D.N.Y. 1934), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub
nom, United States v. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp., 76 F.2d 617 (2d Cir. 1935), aff’d in part,
rev’d in part, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
68. THOMAS K. MCCRAW, PROPHETS OF REGULATION 199 (Belknap Press 1984).
69. James M. Landis, Chairman, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Address before The New England
Council 4 (Nov. 22, 1935).
70. JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OFWALL STREET 158 (Wolters Kluwer 1982).
71. Exchange Act § 15A, 15 U.S.C. § 78o (2012) (registered securities associations).
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provided for national securities exchanges under the Exchange Act.
National associations were modeled closely on the duties and
responsibilities that had already been delegated to national securities
exchanges in the Exchange Act, but with the intent that association
membership criteria be more inclusive than membership in an exchange.72
Congress mandated that these self-policing organizations would
supervise the conduct of their members and take disciplinary action where
necessary. The approach was described as “. . . cooperative regulation, in
which the job is largely done by the representative organizations of
investment bankers, dealers, and brokers, with the Government exercising
appropriate supervision in the public interest, but occupying what may be
termed a residual role.” 73
Congress gave these associations the right to create rules and to ensure
their members’ compliance with the specific requirements of the federal
securities laws, as well as to promote just and equitable principles of trade
and high standards of commercial honor. Thus, aside from supporting its
members’ interests generally, the principal function of any national
securities association is regulating its members through a continuous
program of rulemaking, interpretation, surveillance, and enforcement of the
applicable federal securities laws and its own ethical standards. Major
industry groups endorsed it, with minor changes.74
The Maloney Act parallels the exchange provisions of the Exchange
Act. The Commission was given jurisdiction over associations and the
power to impose rules. Keeping with the concept introduced in the
72. Regulation of Over-The-Counter Markets, Hearings before the Subcomm. of the Comm. on
Interstate & Foreign Commerce, 75th Cong. 17 (1938) [hereinafter Over-The-Counter Market
Hearing].
Mr. Reece: The first section of this bill dealing with the associations is not materially
different from the provisions of the Stock Exchange Act, dealing with the stock
exchange? That is, there is not any new principle here?
Mr. Matthews: No, sir. We have tried to run them parallel as closely as we could. Of
course there is this fundamental distinction growing out of the nature of the business:
The stock exchange is an exclusive organization. This cannot be exclusive. Anybody
who will abide by the rules of the game, who has a decent character, can come into this
association. There is not a property right in a seat in this association which could be
transferred. The aim has been not to narrow, but to spread out, to get into this
association as many as we can of these people, and then if they come in and form the
association, to parallel the stock-exchange situation as closely as the nature of things
permit. But basically there is this difference in conception, that a stock exchange
necessarily is an exclusive organization and this cannot be.
Id.
73. Regulation of Over-The Counter Markets, Hearings before the S. Banking & Currency
Comm., on S.R. 3255, 75th Cong. 16 (1938) (statement of George C. Mathews, Comm’r, Sec.
Exch. Comm’n).
74. The Congressional Record refers to endorsements from the Investment Bankers
Conference, The Investment Bankers Association of America, the New York Securities Dealers
Association and groups from other states. Id. at 6.
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Securities Act of incorporating market professionals into the policing of the
markets, the association had the responsibility to adopt and enforce rules,
but the Commission retained oversight of the both associations and
exchanges.75 Although the statute allows for the possibility of more than
one association, to this date there is only one fully functional, registered
national securities association.76
To summarize, the Exchange Act and the Maloney Act complete the
paradigm of an integrated system of regulation, managed in the first
instance by market professionals. This paradigm relies on the registered
exchanges and the registered securities associations to enforce the federal
securities laws, and to develop and enforce their own rules of member
conduct and behavior. With a couple of exceptions, brokers and dealers
registered with the Commission and wishing to conduct public business are
required to be a member of either an exchange or an association.77
With the passage of the Maloney Act, the federal securities laws came
to equipoise; progressive principals of transparency, disclosure, and fairness
had become law. The architects of the federal securities laws put their own
spin on the progressive approach by mobilizing industry to set standards for
conduct, discipline its members, and bear many of the costs of the
regulatory scheme. They also required the industry to participate in the
regulatory process and to determine the precise rules of conduct and
trading. As quasi-governmental actors, the self-regulatory organizations
(SROs) also enjoyed immunity from private damage suits resulting from
their exercise of regulatory responsibilities.78 This Self-Regulatory
Paradigm controlled the analysis and revision of the federal securities laws
for the next thirty-five years. The paradigm remained unchallenged until a
75. While this system is commonly referred to as “self-regulation,” it was not viewed as such
at the time.
We have felt, as I say, that a voluntary association was highly desirable. This bill we do
not consider a self-regulating bill as setting up a self-regulating organization. It is, on
the contrary, in so many directions, under the regulation and prescription of the
Securities and Exchange Commission that it cannot be so called.
Over-The-Counter Market Hearing, supra note 73, at 21 (testimony of Francis E. Frothingham,
President, Investment Bankers Ass’n of America, testimony of Francis E. Frothingham, President
of the Investment Bankers Association of America). “Self-Regulatory Organization” was not
defined until the adoption of § 3(a) of the Exchange Act as part of the 1975 Amendments.
76. The National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD), the predecessor to the Financial
Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) registered with the Commission as a National Securities
Association in 1939. The National Futures Association is registered with the Commission as a
special purpose national securities association for the purpose of regulating single stock futures.
77. The efficacy and efficiency of self-regulation has been debated for decades. See generally
Sam Scott Miller, Self-Regulation of the Securities Markets: A Critical Examination, 42 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 853 (1985).
78. Standard Inv. Chartered, Inc. v. Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 637 F.3d 112, 115 (2d
Cir. 2011) (“SRO and it officers are entitled to absolute immunity from private damage suits in
connection with the discharge of their regulatory responsibilities.”).
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different crisis brought renewed attention to the operation of the public
exchanges and to the SEC’s role in supervision. The anomalies identified
during this crisis caused the Commission to question the original principles
of the Exchange Act. Ultimately a new paradigm would emerge that
favored direct SEC authority over exchanges and associations and more
government intervention in the structure of equity markets.
III. THE PAPERWORK CRISIS AND THE 1975 AMENDMENTS: A
NEW PARADIGM EMERGES
As Kuhn noted in Structure, a dominant paradigm can only shift once
practitioners begin to identify anomalies or weaknesses in the dominant
approach.79 This is especially so when the operation of the paradigm is
perceived as preventing the development of new approaches that may
benefit the discipline. As early as 1963, the SEC highlighted the risk of
market disruption created by inefficiencies in the system for securities
clearance and settlement.80 Those fears came to were realized in what has
become known as the paperwork crisis.81 Although systems of
communication had improved and volumes of traded securities skyrocketed,
the industry did not modernize the system for clearance and settlement of
those securities, which remained a manual process. The lack of prompt and
accurate settlement creates significant risks for firms. They require
securities and cash to be transferred and delivered to ensure that customer
balances are correct, to manage the firm’s own risk positions, and to
calculate the amount of net capital required for regulatory purposes.
When volume increased substantially, the ability to settle trades was
overwhelmed by the amount of paperwork.82 The NYSE started reducing
trading hours and at one point stopped trading on Wednesdays in an attempt
to give firms time to catch up on the mounting backlog of documentation
required to settle transactions. In some cases, the NYSE under its own
authority limited the activities of member firms until they took steps to
decrease the paperwork backlog. Numerous firms failed during this period
and the liquidation was complicated by the lack of completed clearance and
settlement paperwork.83 The paperwork crisis provided the impetus for both
Congress and the Commission to examine different aspects of capital
market operation.84 These studies coincided with a shift in the views of
79. KUHN, supra note 6, at 77–91.
80. H.R. REP. NO. 96-746, pt. 2 (1963).
81. See SELIGMAN, supra note 70, at 450–64.
82. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, STUDY OF UNSAFE AND UNSOUND PRACTICES OF BROKERS
ANDDEALERS 13–14 (1971) [hereinafter 1971 STUDY].
83. JERRY W. MARKHAM, A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES FROM ENRON-ERA
SCANDALS TO THEGREAT RECESSION 363 (2004-2009) (Routledge, 2011).
84. Reacting to the issues presented by firms failing and the difficulties with liquidation,
Congress quickly passed the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970 (“SIPA”) which created
the Securities Investor Protection Corporation to oversee firm liquidations. It was a non-
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many SEC staffers away from the Self-Regulatory Paradigm and toward an
approach in which the Commission, rather than the industry, would play the
primary role in the development of the capital markets.85
Between 1971 and 1975, SEC staff developed a new vision of equity
market structure. The Commission actively lobbied Congress for greater
authority to supervise the development of equity markets. In March of
1971, the Commission transmitted its Institutional Investor Study Report to
Congress.86 The Institutional Investor Study Report examined the effect of
increased institutional ownership of stocks and implied that the markets and
the industry had reached consensus with regard to market structure: “A
major goal and ideal of the securities markets and the securities industry has
been the creation of a strong central market system for securities of national
importance, in which all buying and selling interest in these securities could
participate and be represented under a competitive regime.”87
In December of 1971, the Commission published its Study of Unsafe
and Unsound Practices of Brokers and Dealers.88 The 1971 Study detailed
the remedial action taken to avoid a repeat of the large number of firm
failures that occurred in the late 1960’s. The study also identified additional
anomalies emerging in the Self-Regulatory Paradigm. Specifically, it
appeared to the Commission that the SROs in general, and the NYSE in
particular, had acted too slowly in identifying the looming crisis and then
lacked a coherent plan to resolve the crisis. The Commission recommended
that it be granted more authority in four areas: (1) the processing of
securities transactions; (2) the rule making authority of SROs; (3) the
enforcement of SRO rules; and (4) the administration of disciplinary
proceedings conducted by SROs.89 The Commission also indicated that it
governmental agency that was funded by assessments of member firms. This approach is
consistent with the then dominant self- regulatory paradigm; a quasi-governmental organization
funded by the industry was given special responsibilities in a specified area. See Securities
Investor Protection Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-598, 84 Stat. 1636 (1970) (codified as amended at
15 U.S.C. § 78aaa (2012)). SIPA established the Securities Investor Protection Corporation
(“SIPC”).
85. In the Midst of Revolution: The SEC, 1973-1981, SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N HISTORICAL
SOC’Y, http://www.sechistorical.org/museum/galleries/rev/rev03d.php (last visited Jan. 24, 2017).
Some SEC staff believed that the evolution of the markets required new and more
fundamental regulation. It was not enough, they contended, merely to inform investors
through the disclosure of information about companies. What was needed was assertive
regulation to reform the institutions and structures of the market mechanisms, including
the exchanges, to promote the efficiency, stability, liquidity, and capacity of the market
in times of increasing volume of stock transactions. The automation and centralization
of the market system seemed to be an obvious method for achieving those results.
Id.
86. See SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR STUDY REPORT OF THE SEC. &
EXCH. COMM’N (1971).
87. Id. at XXIV (letter of Transmittal from Richard B. Smith, Comm’r).
88. See generally 1971 STUDY, supra note 82.
89. Id. at 5.
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would exercise more influence on the operation of the markets, stating that
it would “monitor and actively consult with members of the industry
regarding the development of automated systems for each stage of the
transaction handling process: order entry, execution, comparison, clearance,
settlement, custody and transfer.”90
In February of 1972, the Commission further solidified its views in the
Statement on the Future Structure of the Securities Markets (1972 Policy
Statement), stating:
In order to maximize the depth and liquidity of our markets, so that
securities can be bought and sold at reasonable, continuous, and stable
prices, and to ensure that each investor will receive the best possible
execution of his order, regardless of where it originates, it is generally
agreed that action must be taken to create a single central market system
of listed securities.91
The SEC defined “central market system” as: “. . . a system of
communications by which the various elements of the marketplace, be they
exchanges or over-the-counter markets, are tied together. It also includes a
set of rules governing the relationships which prevail among market
participants.”92 The Commission explained the goals of a central market
system as:
[T]o make information on prices, volume, and quotes for securities in all
markets available to all investors, so that buyers and sellers of securities,
wherever located, can make informed investment decisions and not pay
more than the lowest price at which someone is willing to sell, or not sell
for less than the highest price a buyer is prepared to offer.93
In 1973, the Commission continued its initiative, releasing another
policy statement that further articulated its vision of a central market
system.94 Taken together, these statements show the Commission’s
evolution from the passive approach represented by the Self-Regulatory
Paradigm toward a new and more aggressive approach. Within the
paperwork crisis, the Commission staff had seen difficulties with the older
paradigm and began to argue for modifications. Such modifications would
allow the SEC to expand its mission and become an active participant in the
development and structure of equity markets. At the heart of this change
was a paradox—while the Commission’s goal was to create a central
market, the NYSE maintained a near monopoly on the trading of NYSE
90. Id. at 37.
91. 1972 Policy Statement, supra note 5, at 7.
92. Id. at 8.
93. Id. at 12.
94. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, POLICY STATEMENT OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION ON THE STRUCTURE OF A CENTRALMARKET SYSTEM (1973).
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listed securities and was thus already the de facto central market.95
However, it was an organization of limited membership, which limited
access and charged dearly, in the form of fixed commissions, to access that
liquidity.96 One may wonder whether the aggressive approach by the
Commission was aimed less at creating an optimal market structure and
more at weakening the NYSE’s dominant position.97
After in-depth hearings, Congress passed the 1975 Amendments, and
the national market system (NMS) concept was codified in § 11A of the
Exchange Act.98 The term “national market system” is not defined in the
statute. Rather, it is described in a list of five characteristics that the NMS
should encourage:
(1) Economically efficient executions;
(2) Fair competition among market participants;
(3) Availability of information about quotations and transactions in
securities;
(4) Practicability of executing customer orders in the best market; and
(5) An opportunity for customer orders to be executed without the
participation of a dealer.99
The 1975 Amendments changed the fundamental relationship
between the SEC and the markets it regulates, going far beyond the
issues presented by the paperwork crisis. In the New Deal vision, the
markets were largely left to regulate and police themselves. The SEC
was, as Chairman William O. Douglas put it, the proverbial shotgun in
95. Norman S. Posner, Restructuring The Stock Markets: A Critical Look At The SEC’s
National Market System, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 883, 891 (1981).
96. H.R. REP. NO. 96-746, pt. 2, at 256–67 (1963); Richard R. West & Seha M. Tinic,
Minimum Commission Rates on the New York Stock Exchange Transactions, THE BELL J. ECON.
&MGMT. SCI., 577, 557–605 (1971).
97. Notably, these policy statements, are limited to “listed securities.” The monopoly operator
concerns in the listed market seemed not to be as acute in the over-the-counter market. In fact, the
Commission praised the development of a more centralized system in the over-the counter market,
noting its “satisfaction with the manner in which the NASDAQ communications system has been
operating.” 1972 Policy Statement, supra note 5, at 9. By 1995, the Commission would sanction
the NASD for operating a non-competitive OTC market. In re Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, Inc.,
Exchange Act Release No. 37,538, 62 SEC Docket 1346 (Aug. 8, 1996).
98. The Commission began implementing its vision prior to the adoption of the 1975
Amendments by adopting Rule 17a-15, which required the exchanges and the NASD to submit a
plan for a consolidated tape, that is a collection of exchange and over the counter transaction for
listed securities (the “Consolidated Tape Plan”). Commenters have questioned whether or not the
Commission had the authority under the Exchange Act to require such a system. Posner, supra
note 95, at 905–06 (The immediate effect of the ‘75 Act amendments was the registration of The
Consolidated Tape Plan as a Securities Information Processor).
99. Exchange Act § 11A(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78-k1 (2012).
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the closet.100 As such, it was generally a reactive rather than a proactive
agency. If abuses in the system manifest themselves, the SEC had the
authority and flexibility to address those issues.
After the 1975 Amendments, the Commission believed it was granted
broader authority to oversee the SROs and was specifically designated to
facilitate a radically new vision of equity securities trading, the NMS.101
Partially to ensure the creation of an NMS, the SEC was granted additional
review and disciplinary powers over the SROs The Commission now had
the authority to review and approve rules filed by each SRO. The 1975
Amendments also gave the Commission the power to directly discipline
SROs for failure to enforce their own rules and other failures in their
regulatory responsibilities.102
Interestingly, as the de facto central market, the NYSE had no desire to
provide broader access to its quotations and execution facilities.103 As one
SEC Commissioner stated:
[T]he New York Stock Exchange has not evolved into a national market
system, and its share of the order flow has tended to deteriorate in recent
years, although one would expect that the development of modern
communications technology would have brought about the opposite result.
I suggest that a main reason for this failure has been restraints on
competition. The Exchange has sought in many ways to channel orders to
its market but has maintained or erected barriers to competition with, and
within, that market.104
100. WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS, DEMOCRACY AND FINANCE: THE ADDRESSES AND PUBLIC
STATEMENTS OF WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS AS MEMBER AND CHAIRMAN OF THE SECURITIES AND
EXCHANGE COMMISSION 82 (1940).
101. “In the 1975 Amendments, Congress directed the Commission to oversee the development
of a national market system. Congress granted the Commission broad, discretionary powers to
oversee the development of a fully integrated national market system for the processing and
settlement of securities transactions.” SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, FIRM QUOTE AND TRADE-
THROUGHDISCLOSURE RULE FOR OPTIONS n.13 (2001).
102. Exchange Act § 19, 15 U.S.C. § 78s (Exchange Act section 19(a) sets forth the procedures
for approval of SRO rules. The power to review and reject or abrogate SRO rules meant that the
Commission could directly influence the development of the market structures at each exchange.;
see also 15 U.S.C. § 78s(h) (Exchange Act section 19(h) gives the Commission the authority to
sanction SROs and their officers and directors for failure to enforce their own rules and the federal
securities laws); see, e.g., In re Salvatore F. Sodano, Exchange Act Release No. 59,141, 94 SEC
Docket 2968 (Dec. 22, 2008).
103. The NYSE was slow to embrace this expanded federal mandate. “It has not been easy for
the New York Stock Exchange and the American Stock Exchange to accept this idea that
competing markets should have equal exposure along with their tapes and to cooperate in bringing
this about.” Ray Garrett Jr., Chairman, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Address at the Nat’l Ass’n of Sec.
Dealers, The Consolidated Tape: A Perspective, Speech before the National Association of
Securities Dealers 9 (Jan. 15, 1974).
104. Philip A. Loomis, Jr., Remarks Before the Joint Securities Conference Sponsored by the
NASD, Boston Stock Exchange and the SEC: The Securities Acts Amendments of 1975, Self-
Regulation and the National Market System, 8 (Nov. 18, 1975).
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In 1978, after the Commission issued yet another policy statement that
called for a central limit order book, the NYSE relented somewhat and
agreed to the first linkage plan, known as the Intermarket Trading System
(ITS). At first it was simply a linked Teletype machine that transmitted
orders between exchanges. Part of its rules included the “trade through”
prohibition, which required members to route orders to markets displaying
better quotations before executing a trade on its own market at an inferior
price. Participants were given one minute to respond.105
All of these developments were cited as furthering the objectives of
Congress in the 1975 Amendments.106 Commissioner Loomis saw this as an
extremely positive evolution in the NMS concept. According to him, “[i]t
provide[d] a maximum opportunity for such orders to interact and to be
matched, and it enable[d] market professionals, particularly market makers,
to have access to the entire order flow and this in turn greatly improve[d]
their ability to perform their functions effectively and efficiently.”107
With the passage of the 1975 Amendments, the proponents of a new,
more aggressive approach to securities regulation gained the upper hand.
The question was how the Commission would use this new grant of
authority. Would it encourage the evolution of the self-regulatory structures
of the Exchange and Maloney Acts, or would it take a different approach?
As argued below, the Commission’s approach would shift away from the
Self-Regulatory Paradigm and embrace a new epistemological foundation
for the federal securities laws.
IV. PARADIGM SHIFT: SELF-REGULATION TOMICRO-
INTERVENTION
While Kuhn describes paradigm shifts as revolutions, he also
recognizes that they take time to fully manifest themselves.108 The 1975
Amendments gave the Commission the authority to depart from the
regulatory framework established in the Securities Act, the Exchange Act,
and the Maloney Act. Instead of allowing market professionals to address
the issues in their respective markets, it empowered the Commission to
intervene in certain areas to “facilitate” the development of a national
market system.109 After the 1975 Amendments, the Commission had greater
authority to directly influence or even to dictate the mechanics of equity
trading. As the Commission began to exercise that authority, a new
paradigm developed, one that I call the Micro-Intervention Paradigm. From
105. Robert L.D. Colby & Eric Sirri, Consolidation and Competition in the U.S. Equity
Markets, 5 CAPITALMKTS. L.J. 1, 14 (2010).
106. Harold M. Williams, Address at the Sec. Indus. Ass’n, 1978 Annual Convention, The
Securities Industry and The National Market System: A Current Perspective (Nov. 30, 1978).
107. Loomis Jr., supra note 104, at 11.
108. KUHN, supra note 6, at ch. XII, The Resolution of Revolutions.
109. Exchange Act § 11A(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78-k1 (2012).
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an epistemological standpoint, it neither fits squarely within the Self-
Regulatory Paradigm nor does it completely replace it. Instead, it
incorporates core elements of the self-regulatory structure and seeks to
make them more effective by allowing the Commission to influence or
impose structures on the industry.
In the short term, the Commission achieved its goal of providing better
access to quotations and better dissemination of market information.110
However, its approach to the instructions to “facilitate” the development of
an NMS resulted in more Commission intervention in market operations.
As a consequence, the Commission now needed to adopt rules addressing
the mechanics of equity market structure on a regular and active basis. New
technologies, new market models, and new instruments taxed the existing
concepts and regulations, requiring an ever increasing need for guidance,
interpretation, and rule making. Thus, over time, the Commission rather
than the markets has become the primary arbiter of the structure of equities
trading. In a world of finite regulatory resources, the Commission seemed
less inclined to use its authority to improve the self-regulatory framework.
As an example of this dichotomy, one can compare and contrast the
Commission’s approach to simultaneous crisis in equity market regulation
and equity market structure. I will focus on two related events from the mid
1990’s: the SEC’s Report of Investigation of the NASD and the adoption of
the Order Handling Rules. The contrast between them underscores the
difficulty in reconciling the Self-Regulatory Paradigm with the emerging
Micro-Intervention Paradigm.
A. THENASD 21(a) REPORT111
In 1994, William G. Christie and Paul H. Schultz published an
economic analysis of quotations on the NASDAQ market. This paper
observed the presence of quoting increments and strongly suggested that
NASDAQ market makers were acting in concert to keep those quotations
artificially wide.112 At that time, quotations were posted as fractions in
increments of one-eighth of a dollar (12.5 cents). Instead of posting an offer
to sell at 3 1/8, market makers routinely quoted in the next increment (i.e., 3
1/4). This had the effect of changing the price available to the public by
12.5 cents. This convention was referred to as avoiding odd-eighths. This
practice led to multiple class action lawsuits and an SEC investigation. The
Commission’s Report of Investigation concluded that NASDAQ market
makers had engaged in numerous anti-competitive and abusive practices,
110. See Onnig H. Dombalagian, Licensing the Word on the Street: The SEC’s Role in
Regulating Information, 55 BUFFALO L. REV. 63, 75 (2007).
111. REPORT PURSUANT TO SECTION 21(a) OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934
REGARDING THENASD AND THENASDAQMARKET (1996) [hereinafter NASD 21(a) REPORT].
112. William G. Christie & Paul H. Schultz, Why Do NASDAQ Market Makers Avoid Odd–
Eighth Quotes?, 49 J. FIN. 1813, 1813–40 (1994).
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including: colluding to avoid odd-eighth quotes, coordinating price
quotations and trading reports, sharing proprietary information without the
customer’s knowledge or consent, failing to honor price quotations, and
poor trade reporting practices.113
The Commission determined that NASD, the SRO responsible for
supervising the NASDAQ market, had failed in its duties under the federal
securities laws. The NASD appeared to be captured by its market maker
members, deferring to their views rather than enforcing NASD rules or the
federal securities laws. The SEC’s Report documents a culture of failed
regulation where members were viewed as clients and market conventions
were largely left to the members to set, disciplinary processes were
interfered with, and enforcement was used to discourage competition.114 To
illustrate just how far the NASD had gone astray, the SEC uncovered that
the 1995 bonus of a senior NASD executive was tied to whether the SEC
brought a formal action against the NASD, creating what appeared to be a
conflict between self-regulatory obligations and personal enrichment.115
Internal documents indicated that NASD senior executives were aware of
the issues and continued to receive outside complaints through the early
1990s. It was not until the Christie-Schultz study became public that
practices on the NASDQ market began to change.116
Given the emphasis of the Exchange Act on self-regulation and the fact
that the Commission’s authority over SROs had been increased as a result
of the 1975 Amendments, one might have expected the SEC to evaluate the
self-regulatory process.117 Specifically, under the Self-Regulatory
Paradigm, one might have expected the Commission to lead an in depth
examination of the regulatory structure of the over-the-counter markets.
113. See NASD 21(a) REPORT, supra note 111.
114. The NASD 21(a) report notes that members had too much influence over the disciplinary
process, including encouraging enforcement actions against competitors while discouraging
enforcement of Commission Rules. Id. It further concluded that NASD allowed corporate goals
and competitive concerns to overshadow its regulatory responsibilities. Id. at 42–49.
115. Brett D. Fromson, Make-Over for a Tarnished Stock Market, WASH. POST, Mar. 17, 1997,
at 12.
116. According to the SEC, the NASD was aware of the pricing convention as early as 1990,
but took no steps to address it. See NASD 21(a) REPORT, supra note 111, at 35–36. The NASD
began to address the issue informally after the publication of the Christie-Schultz Study. In a
subsequent paper, the authors document the abandonment of this convention in 5 large stocks after
the publication of the first paper and a meeting of market participants and NASD officials. See
William G. Christie, Jeffrey H. Harris & Paul H. Schultz, Why Did Nasdaq Market Makers Stop
Avoiding Odd-Eighth Quotes?, 49 J. FIN. 1841, 1841 (1994). This meeting is also referenced in
the NASD 21(a) Report. See NASD 21(a) REPORT, supra note 111, at 23.
117. As part of the 1975 amendments the Commission had been granted broad powers to
discipline SROs. Up to this point, it had used this power sparingly. NASD 21(a) REPORT, supra
note 111, at 50; see, e.g., Midwest Clearing Corp., Exchange Act Release No. 31,416 (Nov. 6,
1992), 57 Fed. Reg. 54,435 (Nov. 18, 1992); Chicago Bd. Options Exchange, Ex. Act Release No.
26,809 (May 11, 1989); Philadelphia Stock Exchange, Exchange Act Release No. 16,648 (Mar.
13, 1980); Boston Stock Exchange and Boston Stock Exchange Clearing Corporation, Exchange
Act Release No. 17,183 (Oct. 1, 1980).
2017] Approach to Equity Market Regulation 313
After a complete investigation of the NASD, the Commission neither
reevaluated the self-regulatory process nor articulated changes or
improvements to the self-regulatory system. Instead, the Commission
deferred to the findings of a private committee, chaired by retired Senator
Warren Rudman and paid for by NASD. This committee developed the
regulatory structure of the NASD going forward and has influenced the
evolution of SROs ever since. The SEC ratified most of Rudman’s
recommendations as undertakings by NASD in its Order Instituting
Proceedings against NASD.118
Among the most significant aspects of the Rudman Report is the
recommendation that the regulatory process be split from the market
function. The Rudman Committee believed that this would be possible
under a single SRO structure that maintained and enhanced the regulatory
function.119 In practice, however, it was a deviation from the Self-
Regulatory Paradigm and the rationale underlying both the Exchange Act
and the Maloney Act. The issues at NASD were attributable to a failure to
manage the inherent conflict between the business and regulatory
responsibility of the SRO. But this conflict exists and has always existed in
all self-regulated markets. Indeed, that is the purpose of self-regulation; the
people who are intimately involved in market operations are in the best
position to identify and police those markets. Thus, the problem that needed
to be solved was not that a conflict existed; it was that the NASD lacked the
internal controls necessary to manage the conflict between its
responsibilities to oversee broker-dealers and its operation of the market.
Rather than addressing the self-regulatory system directly by, for
example, promulgating rules for conflict mitigation or asking Congress to
define SRO responsibilities, the Commission embraced Rudman’s
recommendation to separate the market function run by NASDAQ and the
regulatory function for broker-dealers to be run by the NASD. Notably, the
Rudman Committee’s recommendations were addressing a specific issue
within the structure of the NASD/NASDAQ situation. It was not
articulating a rule for general application to all equity markets.120 While the
Rudman Committee’s suggestion of separation still contemplated close
cooperation between the market and the regulator, in practice the normative
118. Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealer Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 37,538, 62 SEC Docket 1346
(Aug. 8, 1996).
119. WARREN B. RUDMAN ET AL., EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE REPORT OF THE NASD
SELECT COMMITTEE ON STRUCTURE AND GOVERNANCE TO THE NASD BOARD OF GOVERNORS
22 (1995).
120. This recommendation was attempting to deal with the conflict presented by the NASD
being the primary regulator for OTC markets and the operation of the NASDAQ market and
assumed that Nasdaq would be creating rules for the OTC markets, not operating as an exchange.
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model of self-regulation developed into complete separation.121 As the next
example illustrates, as the Commission shifted away from the Self–
Regulatory Paradigm, it departed from an area of its traditional expertise
and expanded into a new approach based on Commission intervention into
the mechanics of trading. Arguably, the Commission ceded its role in
defining self-regulatory responsibilities and duties to the industry, and
began to usurp the role of the industry in equity market development. Thus,
as the Commission shifted to the Micro-Intervention Paradigm, the focus
was not on the improvement of the operation of self-regulatory structures;
rather, it was on developing a solution based on SEC intervention into the
mechanics of trading.
B. THEORDERHANDLINGRULES
In 1996, invoking its authority under the 1975 Amendments, the
Commission adopted a series of rules designed to increase transparency by
requiring market makers to publically display customer limit orders that
would improve prices of existing quotations. These became known as the
“Order Handling Rules.” 122 The adopting release cites a Commission study
that recommended better disclosure of order handling practices generally,
but that did not recommend that the Commission dictate such practices.123
The Order Handling Rules, as adopted, used the authority granted the
Commission under the 1975 Amendments to mandate broker–dealer routing
practices. While the 1975 Amendments gave the Commission the authority
to “facilitate the development of a national market system,” it is not at all
clear to some observers that Congress envisioned direct SEC intervention
into such decisions.124
In a nutshell, the SEC’s Limit Order Display Rule requires a market
maker to display customer limit orders that (1) are priced better than a
market maker’s quote, or (2) add to the size associated with a market
maker’s quote when the market maker is at the best price in the market. The
Order Handling Rules amended the SEC’s Quote Rule to require a market
maker to display in its quote any better-priced orders. The stated purposes
of these rules were greater transparency and access. As the Commission
noted, “[c]omprehensive and transparent information about market
121. RUDMAN ET. AL., supra note 119, at 22 (“The NASD and the NASDAQ market should not
be divorced, but regulation of the broker-dealer profession should otherwise be separated from
and performed independently of regulation of the NASDAQ and other OTC markets.”)
122. Order Execution Obligations, 61 Fed. Reg. 48,290 (Sept. 12, 1996) (codified at 17 C.F.R.
pt. 240).
123. DIV. OF MKT. REG. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N., MARKET 2000: AN EXAMINATION OF
CURRENT EQUITYMARKETDEVELOPMENTS 22–25 (Jan. 1994).
124. Letter from Ralph C. Ferrara, former General Counsel, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, to Robert
G. Britz, Group Exec. Vice President, N.Y.S.E. (Apr. 5, 2000) (In describing the 1975
Amendments, Mr. Ferrara noted: “After sparring on the subject with ideologues of every stripe,
Congress settled on the verb ‘facilitate’ rather than ‘establish.’ It was a wise choice.”).
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conditions is critical to efficient and competitive markets for all investors,
whether retail or institutional.”125
The Commission, keen to increase transparency and encourage
competition, included electronic systems that automatically matched orders,
and in the case of listed securities, provided the markets with execution
alternatives that did not require the intervention of an exchange specialist.126
These systems were called electronic communications networks (ECNs).
The Commission recognized that these systems had become integrated into
the securities markets and provided much needed completion to market
makers and specialists; however, the widespread use of what the
Commission called “hidden markets” frustrated the NMS goal of greater
transparency.127
To accommodate the evolution of ECNs and to further integrate them
into the NMS, the Commission added a new compliance option for broker-
dealers, the “ECN display alternative.”128 This allowed broker-dealers to
satisfy their obligations under the Quote Rule by sending an order to an
ECN that widely disseminated the quote publicly. To ensure the
accessibility and dissemination of those quotations, the Commission also
required all SROs to both display and to provide access to ECN quotes.129
The Commission’s direct intervention in equity market structure had
significant consequences. While it could now encourage more competition
in market execution services, it ran the risk of putting its thumb on the
scales and picking the winners and losers in the equity markets.
In the Order Handling Rules, the Commission is very clear about its
NMS goals and extremely specific about the responsibilities of broker–
dealers, going as far as dictating their order display requirements and
options. However, it was less precise about the duties and responsibilities of
an ECN. Recall that under the Exchange Act and the Self-Regulatory
Paradigm, the Commission was concerned with both the identification of
entities and assigning duties and responsibilities that flowed from their
status. Specialists and market makers, for example, had special status and
informational advantages and in turn were subject to affirmative and
negative obligations in the market place.130
125. Order Execution Obligations, 61 Fed. Reg. at 48,308 n.223.
126. The Commission had sought to regulate what it called “automated trading information
systems” since the 1960s. In 1969, the Commission proposed Rule 15c2-10 under the Exchange
Act (17 C.F.R. 240.15c2-10) to “provide a regulatory framework for automated trading
information systems that are not within the existing scope of regulation of exchanges and national
securities associations.” U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N., 35TH ANNUAL REPORT 5 (1969), https://
www.sec.gov/about/annual_report/1969.pdf (Ultimately the Commission abandoned this rule
making and informally established a system whereby such systems could operate as broker-
dealers.).
127. Order Execution Obligations, 61 Fed. Reg. at 48,291 n.5, 48,298 n.94, 48,299 n.113-14.
128. 17 C.F.R. § 242.604 (2017).
129. Order Execution Obligations, 61 Fed. Reg. at 48,291 n.5, 48,298 n.94, 48,299 n.113-14.
130. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 240.11b-1 (2017).
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As the Commission shifted to the Micro-Intervention Paradigm, it
became less concerned with defining the duties and responsibilities of
market participants and more focused on defining the terms of trading. In
the OHRs, for example, the Commission granted the ECNs a special unique
status as a display alternative. This no doubt encouraged completion and
allowed ECNs to compete in the NMS.131 However, the Commission did
not adopt rules regarding ECN regulation; rather, it continued the informal
process of granting staff no-action letters to entities that sought to act as
display alternatives under the OHRs.132 Not surprisingly, the number and
trading volumes of these entities grew, creating a new regulatory problem
for the Commission; having granted a special status to non-exchanges, how
could it ensure that the transparency sought by the Order Handling Rules
would be achieved and that these entities would be properly policed?
In sum, the Commission’s approach in the NASD Order and the Order
Handling Rules illustrates the paradigm shift brought about by the 1975
Amendments. When faced with a failure of epic proportions in the
regulatory structure established by the self-regulatory framework, the
Commission took a passive approach to the authority granted it under the
1975 Amendments. That is, although it sanctioned the SRO, it declined the
opportunity to codify substantive SRO standards suitable for evolving
markets. Arguably, it ceded its traditional policy making role with regard to
self-regulation to a committee paid for by the NASD. That committee,
rather than the Commission, established a new standard for over-the-
counter SRO compliance, one based on independence from markets, rather
than conflict management within markets. It is as if the Commission viewed
131. One ECN described the adoption of the Order Handling Rules as a seismic event in its
history:
Turning point came in 1997 when the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
promulgated new order handling rules that required Nasdaq market makers to send on
to ECNs any limit orders whose price fell between the market maker’s best buy and sell
prices. Those ECN prices were displayed on the Nasdaq ticker. “For me to be able to
have my orders displayed over the Nasdaq system was an absolute seminal event,”
Matthew Andresen, the day-trader at Datek who was one of the first to understand the
rule’s import, told the Dallas Morning News. “It’s the difference between trying to sell
your house with a sign in the yard or without a sign.”
The Island ECN, Inc. History, FUNDING UNIVERSE, http://www.fundinguniverse.com/company-
histories/the-island-ecn-inc-history (last visited Jan. 25, 2017).
132. No Action Letters, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N,
https://www.sec.gov/answers/noaction.htm (last visited Jan. 25, 2017) (“Most no-action letters
describe the request, analyze the particular facts and circumstances involved, discuss applicable
laws and rules, and, if the staff grants the request for no action, concludes that the SEC staff would
not recommend that the Commission take enforcement action against the requester based on the
facts and representations described in the individual’s or entity’s request.” While the Commission
defined ECN, it never promulgated rules for establishing a formal registration process or objective
standards for ECNs. The Staff conferred ECN status via no action letters.).
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the mandate of the 1975 Amendments as limiting, rather than strengthening,
its authority to intervene in the SRO system. 133
On the other hand, when faced with an issue of equity market structure,
the Commission took an aggressive approach, using its authority under the
1975 Amendments to adopt a set of precise, proscriptive rules regulating
the handling of individual orders. This was a foray into an area where the
Commission had not traditionally ventured and represented a stretch of
authority into an area where the Commission had no previous demonstrated
expertise. In terms of Kuhn’s analysis, these two events represent anomalies
in the old paradigm being identified and a new paradigm emerging. In
shifting toward the Micro-Intervention Paradigm, the Commission started to
be the arbitrator of market structure and from this point on, it would have a
much greater role in equity market development.
C. THEREGULATION OF ELECTRONIC TRADING SYSTEMS:
REGULATIONATS134
In creating the ECN alternative, the Commission succeeded in
encouraging market competition and in opening market structure to new
technology and innovation. Yet automated systems that were not ECNs
were not required to display quotations. According to the Commission, by
1998 such systems accounted for more than twenty percent of the orders for
securities listed on the NASDAQ market.135 The Commission’s success in
encouraging competition between the markets required it to address the
regulatory status of those systems. Regulation ATS allows an emerging
group of trading centers to operate electronic trading markets, with the
choice of either registering as national securities exchanges or registering as
broker-dealers and complying with additional record keeping requirements
and, at certain thresholds, the requirement to display quotes in the public
markets. It also provided a blueprint for entities wishing to register as
exchanges. These provisions are addressed in turn.
1. Adapting the Framework to Include Alternative Trading
Systems
The Commission adopted a new rule, Rule 3b-16, which revised the
Exchange Act definition of “exchange” to include a marketplace that:
133. For a discussion of the myriad issues currently facing SROs, see generally Onnig H.
Dombalagian, Self and Self-Regulation: Resolving the SRO Identity Crisis, 1 BROOK. J. CORP.
FIN. & COM. L. 317 (2007).
134. I concentrate on the effects of Regulation ATS on the Self-Regulatory Paradigm. For a
more complete discussion of the development of Regulation ATS see Roberta S. Karmel, Turning
Seats Into Shares: Cause and Implication of Demutualization of Stock and Futures Exchanges, 53
HASTINGS L.J. 367, 370–81 (2002).
135. Regulation of Exchanges and Alternative Trading Systems, 63 Fed. Reg. 70,844, 70,845
(Dec.22, 1998) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 202, 240, 242, and 249).
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(1) Brings together the orders for securities of multiple buyers and sellers;
and
(2) Uses established, non-discretionary methods (whether by providing a
trading facility or by setting rules) under which such orders interact with
each other, and the buyers and sellers entering such orders agree to the
terms of a trade.136
This change clarified that Alternative Trading Systems (ATSs) were in
fact exchanges under the Exchange Act definition. After clarifying the
ATSs’ status under the federal securities laws, the Commission provided
two options: (1) register as a national securities exchange under § 6 of the
Exchange Act or (2) register as a broker–dealer, and thereby subject itself to
the self-regulatory scrutiny of either an exchange or a national securities
association.137 Under the first option, if an ATS chose to register as a
national securities exchange, it would be required to meet the requirements
of § 6 of the Exchange Act, namely to perform self-regulatory functions. In
return, the exchange/ATS would be able to participate in NMS plans, share
in data revenue from the consolidated tapes, and list securities. Under the
second option, it could not perform self-regulatory functions, could not list
securities, could not participate in NMS plans, and could not use the term
“exchange” in describing itself.
This approach was a compromise between the more formal
requirements of exchange registration (which might have been too costly or
difficult for some ATSs) and the need for a formal regulatory structure
including registration and record keeping requirements for ATSs.
Exchanges were still required to regulate themselves, to establish rules and
monitor their broker-dealer members for compliance, and to take
disciplinary action when members failed to comply. The Commission also
required the SROs to conduct surveillance of trading on ATSs by
“integrating alternative trading system trading data into the SRO’s existing
surveillance system,” arguably placing additional burdens on registered
exchanges to regulate entities that were in fact their competitors.138
Almost immediately, anomalies developed in this approach. Recall one
of the major goals of the 1975 Amendments was transparency. As then
Commissioner Loomis put it:
Perhaps the cornerstone of a national market system is the creation of a
mechanism by which all, or at least most, of the orders for securities
traded in the system are channeled into the system rather than being
fragmented and dispersed. This concentration of the order flow has at least
two important consequences. It provides a maximum opportunity for such
136. 17 C.F.R. § 240.3b-16 (2017).
137. Id. § 242.301.
138. Recall that this same conflict was at the heart of the Commission’s 21(a) Order. See NASD
21(a) REPORT, supra note 111.
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orders to interact and to be matched, and it enables market professionals,
particularly market makers, to have access to the entire order flow and this
in turn greatly improves their ability to perform their functions effectively
and efficiently.139
Under Regulation ATS, however, orders on an ATS may or may not be
publicly displayed. Their eligibility for display depends on an awkward
calculation of volume in a specific security during a specific time period.
Trading venues with less than five percent of the volume of a specific
security could choose to remain “dark,” meaning that they were not
required to display their quotations publicly. Today this dark liquidity
accounts for approximately fifteen percent of the total market volume and
may frustrate the goals of creating fair and transparent markets.140
2. Regulation ATS: A New Approach to Exchange Registration
and Self-Regulation
As part of Regulation ATS, the Commission recognized that its
implementation had the potential to lead to changes among registered
exchanges in two significant ways. First, it could encourage ATSs to
register as exchanges, and second, it could incentivize existing exchanges to
explore other corporate structures. The preamble to Regulation ATS
contained a section concerning existing registered exchanges and the
possibility of ATSs registering as exchanges.141 The Commission continued
to embrace the self-regulatory system:
The Commission believes that the self-regulatory role of registered
exchanges is fundamental to the enforcement of the federal securities
laws. Congress has delegated to the SROs certain quasi-governmental
functions and responsibilities, and has charged the Commission with
overseeing the SROs to make sure they have the ability and resources to
comply with those obligations.142
At the same time, it adopted approaches that fundamentally altered the
market as SRO model. In the same release the Commission began to
articulate a different approach to self-regulation:
Further, the Commission also believes that the ultimate responsibility for
enforcement and disciplinary actions for violations relating to transactions
executed in an SRO’s market or rules unique to that SRO should continue
to be retained by that SRO. In addition, these exchanges must establish a
139. Loomis Jr., supra note 104, at 11.
140. See, e.g., Hidden Volume Ratios, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov/marke
tstructure/research/highlight-2013-02.html#.WK3VMvkrLIU (last updated Oct. 9, 2013) (finding
that “the hidden volume ratio for stocks is typically between 11% and 14%”).
141. Regulation of Exchanges and Alternative Trading Systems, 63 Fed. Reg. 70,844, 70,880
(Dec. 22, 1998) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 202, 240, 242 and 249).
142. Id. at 70,881.
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disciplinary process including appropriate sanctions for violations of the
rules and a fair procedure for administering the disciplinary process.
Existing exchanges generally employ personnel and establish extensive
programs to fulfill this responsibility. However, it may be possible for an
exchange to contract with another SRO to perform its day-to-day
enforcement and disciplinary activities. Nevertheless, a registered
exchange would retain ultimate responsibility for this function. In
considering an exchange’s application for registration the Commission
will consider whether allowing the exchange to contract with another SRO
to perform its day-to-day enforcement and disciplinary activities would be
consistent with the public interest. (emphasis added)143
In terms of the epistemological analysis, this is a further shift from the
Self-Regulatory Paradigm. Industry participation in regulation is at the core
of the Securities Act and the Exchange Act. These Acts require financial
professionals to act as gatekeepers to the capital markets.144 They give
registered exchanges and, through the Maloney Act, national securities
associations the power to act as quasi-governmental rule makers and
enforcers. The underlying assumption is that the professionals best suited to
regulate a market are the same professionals that run the market.
In Regulation ATS the Commission articulated a model favoring
separation of regulation from markets, and allowed SROs to contract out for
regulatory services. Under the Commission’s new formulation, and
expanding the recommendations in the Rudman Report to the listed
markets, regulation was recast as a market neutral service rather than a
characteristic and an imperative for each market. On their face, the 1975
Amendments were designed to strengthen the Commission’s oversight of
SROs. As part of the 1975 Amendments, Congress recognized the
desirability of a self-regulatory structure (albeit with additional SEC
oversight), and even adopted a definition of “self-regulatory
organization.”145 Under Regulation ATS the Commission was content to
allow regulation, which had been a core function of a market, to be contract
service.146 While the language of Regulation ATS is expressly limited to
“day-to-day enforcement and disciplinary activities,” in practice the
Commission has not objected to allowing all regulatory functions to be
143. Id. at 70,882. The release does not say that an exchange in existence at the time of the
adoption of Regulation ATS would be able to outsource its regulatory functions. Nevertheless, as
of this writing virtually all the exchanges have contracted out some of their self-regulatory
functions to the only existing full service national securities association, FINRA.
144. See generally Coffee, supra note 55.
145. Exchange Act § 3(a)(26), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(26) (2012).
146. The Exchange Act allows the Commission by rule or order, to allocate authority among
self-regulatory organizations. Id. at § 17(d)(1). The ATS formulation is something short of such
delegation as the SRO contracting for regulatory services retains responsibility and presumably
liability for the regulation of its members and markets.
2017] Approach to Equity Market Regulation 321
covered by contract.147 More than twenty years after the adoption of
Regulation ATS, the Commission continues to intervene deeper and deeper
into market microstructure, but has yet to establish rules addressing the
oversight responsibilities of SROs contracting for regulatory services.
Exchanges, perhaps seeking to narrow the competitive gap with ATSs, have
for the most part outsourced self-regulatory functions to third parties. Thus,
the Rudman Committee’s recommendation to separate regulation in the
over-the-counter market has evolved into a normative model where the
regulator is generic and no expertise in the operation of a specific market is
required.
In addition, again invoking the 1975 Amendments, the Commission
stated that exchanges, which up to that point had been mutual associations,
could now be for-profit shareholder companies. In the early 2000s, the
traditional exchanges embraced the Commission’s invitation to become
public companies—a process known as demutualization. As commenters
at the time recognized, the demutualization of exchanges would require a
reconsideration of the responsibilities of SROs.148 The Commission made
no adjustments to the self-regulatory structure to accommodate its
acquiescence in demutualization. Only after blessing demutualization and
after demutualization occurred did the Commission begin to grapple with
the regulatory structure required for these new entities. In 2004, the
Commission issued a concept release that discussed possible governance
standards and other requirements for SROs.149 Informal requirements have
been suggested for exchanges to follow concerning ownership structure and
governance.150 However, these are staff interpretations and are not part of or
supported by Commission rules. In addition, many of the current exchanges
are owned by a parent holding company that performs many of the
147. For example, in late 2014, FINRA announced a contract to provide “market surveillance,
financial surveillance, examinations, investigations and disciplinary services” for the Chicago
Board Options Exchange. FINRA Signs Regulatory Services Agreement with CBOE and C2, FIN.
INDUS. REG. AUTHORITY (Dec. 22, 2014), http://www.finra.org/newsroom/2014/finra-signs-
regulatory-services-agreement-cboe-and-c2.
148. Karmel, supra note 134, at 400.
149. Fair Administration and Governance of Self-Regulatory Organizations, 69 Fed. Reg.
71,255 (Dec. 8, 2004) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 242 and 249). The release discusses
the conflicts inherent in self-regulation, the funding sources for regulation and offers models for
enhanced Commission oversight or alternative SRO structures. See generally id. The private
sector had already weighed in on possible reforms. See Securities Industry Association White
Paper: Reinventing Self- Regulation, SEC. INDUS. & FIN. MARKETS ASS’N (Jan. 5, 2000),
http://www.sifma.org/issues/item.aspx?id=21354. These concepts are already more than a decade
old.
150. See Exchange Act § 6(b)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 78f(b)(3) (2012) (providing that one or more
directors is representative of issuers and investors, and not associated with a member of the
exchange, or with any broker-dealer; and “[assures] a fair representation of its members in the
selection of its directors and administration of its affairs.” An applicant is required to divine what
may pass Commission muster as there are no rules governing representation).
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functions of an SRO, including internal audit, rule writing, and governance.
The regulatory status of these entities has not been examined.
D. REGULATIONNMS: THENEW PARADIGM PREVAILS151
Regulation ATS instituted three major changes to the market regulatory
structure: (1) SROs could outsource one of their primary functions; (2)
exchanges could be demutualized and operated as public companies; and
(3) ATSs, virtual markets themselves, were to be regulated as broker-
dealers.152 Each of these came with its own set of issues. The practical
effects of these regulatory market structure decisions become more apparent
as the Commission has adopted more complex equity market structures. For
example, Regulation NMS is a series of rules addressing market practices.
The regulation amended and renumbered existing rules as 601 and 603,
amended the market data rules, introduced Rule 610 (the so-called Market
Access Rule), introduced Rule 611 (known as the Order Protection Rule),
and concluded with Rule 612 (the Sub-Penny Rule).153 The Order
Protection Rule, for example, presents a series of questions that affect
market regulatory structure. Under this rule,154 trading centers are required
to establish, maintain, and enforce written policies and procedures
reasonably designed to prevent the execution of trades at prices inferior to
protected quotations displayed by other trading centers. In practice, the
Order Protection Rule requires that trading centers route orders to an SRO
that displays the national best bid or offer unless it falls under one or more
of nine exceptions.155 So if the best price is offered on exchange A, then a
trader must execute on that platform and not “trade-through” to exchange B
or C, where the price may be less favorable.156
151. This article focuses on the epistemology underlying equity market regulation. For a
concise analysis of issues presented by Regulation NMS see Equity Market Structure: A Review of
SEC Regulation NMS H. Comm. on Financial Services, Subcomm. on Capital Markets &
Government Sponsored Enterprises (Testimony of Steven Lofchie), http://financialservices.house
.gov/uploadedfiles/hhrg-113-ba16-wstate-slofchie-20140228.
152. Regulation of Exchanges and Alternative Trading Systems, 63 Fed. Reg. 70,844, 70,880
(Dec. 22, 1998) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 202, 240, 242 and 249); see also 17 C.F.R. §
242.301(b)(1) (2017).
153. 17 C.F.R. §§ 242.601, 242.603, 242.610, 242.611, 242.612 (2017).
154. The Order Protection Rule is one of the four substantive rules that comprise Regulation
NMS. Adopted by the Commission in 2005 in a contested vote and implemented in 2007,
Regulation NMS’s other substantive rules include: a requirement that markets provide fair and
non-discriminatory access to quotations, a prohibition on the display of quotations in pricing
increments of less than a penny, and amendments to the formulas currently used to allocate market
data revenues to SROs under joint industry plans. See 17 C.F.R. § 242.611.
155. The Order Protection Rule echoes the “trade through” prohibition of the Intermarket
Trading System from the 1970s. Colby & Sirri, supra note 105.
156. Memorandum from the Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Division of Trading and Markets, to
Market Structure Advisory Committee (Apr. 30, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/equity-
market-structure/issues-affecting-customers-emsac-012616.pdf.
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While the goal of achieving the best price laudable the Commission
once again recognized a special status for a market participant, i.e., the one
displaying a “protected quote.” This status could give registered exchanges
an advantage and might encourage more entities to consider exchange
registration. At the very least this status can be a lifeline for trading
platforms that would not otherwise be competitive. Although the
Commission changed the dynamics of exchange operation, it did not
reevaluate the exchange registration process, so any entity that can register
and operate as an automated exchange is entitled to quote protection
regardless of its reputation, regulatory sophistication, or market share.
Traders placing buy or sell orders in NMS securities must still account for
orders on, for example, the Chicago Stock Exchange, which represents less
than 0.5% of monthly share volume traded nationally.157 Finally, the
provisions of Regulation NMS, and therefore compliance, are complicated
and require nearly constant adjustment.158 Surveillance and enforcement
require the ability to access, analyze, and compare a huge amount of data.
When promulgating Regulation NMS in 2007, the SEC made no real
attempt to have regulatory data available. Consolidated Audit Trail data is
still years away.159
In sum, the Commission was given a mandate in the 1975 Amendments
to encourage completion and innovation and to create a national market
system for securities. In complying with this mandate, the SEC has devoted
a huge amount of resources to intervening in equity market structure. While
doing so, however, it has not provided clear guidance on the market
regulatory structure required to support the mandates of an NMS.
Commission policy (such as allowing the outsourcing of regulatory
functions) may have had the inadvertent effect of weakening the SROs’
ability to perform market regulation. Paradoxically, as the rules of the
Commission and of the exchanges have become more complicated, the
expertise in the operations and the ability to regulate individual market
centers may have been degraded. Arguably, the epistemological approach
adopted by the Commission after the 1975 Amendments elevated
157. Brian Louis & Nick Baker, Chicago Stock Exchange Targets Latency Arbitrage With
Delay, BLOOMBERG MARKETS (Aug, 30, 2016), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-
08-30/chicago-stock-exchange-targets-latency-arbitrage-with-speed-bump.
158. The Micro-Intervention Paradigm requires the Staff of the SEC to provide regular
guidance on a variety of market rules. See, e.g., Division of Market Regulation: Frequently Asked
Questions Concerning Regulation SHO, SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov/divisions/
marketreg/mrfaqregsho1204.htm (last updated Oct. 15, 2015) (linking to Reg. SHO amendments
and several pages of staff guidance).
159. See Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Approves Plan to Create Consolidated
Audit Trail (Nov 15, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2016-240.html. FINRA
claims that its market regulation department “monitors approximately 99 percent of the equities
market.” Market Regulation, FIN. INDUS. REG. AUTHORITY, http://www.finra.org/industry/market-
regulation (last visited Mar. 3, 2017).
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intervention in equity market structure to primary importance while
neglecting the regulatory market structure required to support it.
V. THE PROBLEMWITH THE MICRO-INTERVENTION
PARADIGM
As Kuhn suggests, dominant paradigms begin to demonstrate
anomalies—that is, facts that do not seem to fit the dominant paradigm.
Drawing on publically available data, I can provide a snapshot of equity
markets in a historic context. In 1934, the NYSE had over 75% of the
market share in listed equities. In 2016, the NYSE complexes (that is
NYSE, NYSE Arca, and NYSE Mkt) had, in total, just over 24% of the
monthly volume of market share in listed equities, and the NASDAQ OMX
complexes (NASDAQ, BX, and Phlx) had just over 17%. Almost 37% of
the total volume was conducted over-the-counter.160 Over the last five
years, the NYSE, and to a lesser extent NASDAQ, have been slowly but
steadily losing equity market share to the over-the-counter market.161 The
monopoly hold on equity trading that once existed, and which seemed to
provide the impetus for the 1975 Amendments, is no longer an issue.
Technology, rather than Commission rulemaking, has enabled investors to
reach liquidity not only across the nation, but also across the globe.
At the same time, in contravention to the stated goals of the NMS, non-
displayed orders, such as liquidity in dark pools, have increased. These
quotes arguably piggyback on the quotations on public exchanges without
contributing to price discovery. As demonstrated in the chart below,
between January 1, 2016 and December 31, 2016, approximately 17% of
NMS shares traded were traded on an ATS that does not display its quotes
either to an SRO (such as the FINRA Alternative Display Facility) or to the
ATS’s subscribers. During that period, only NASDAQ (18%) and the
NYSE (17%) accounted for at least as much execution volume as these dark
pools.162 This can be problematic as dark pools are opaque about their
160. Historical Market Volume Data, BATS [hereinafter Historical Market Data],
https://www.bats.com/us/equities/market_statistics/historical_market_volume/ (last visited Mar. 6,
2017). I concentrate here on market fragmentation in the equity markets. I attempted to locate
volume information for 1998, the year Regulation ATS was adopted. Unfortunately, it was not
available. Even if it could be located, in 1998 all trading on NASDAQ was technically over-the-
counter and was treated as such, as NASDAQ was not registered as an exchange but was a
registered quotation system operated by the NASD.
161. Historical Market Data, supra note 160. According to BATS data, in 2015, the NYSE had
24.08% of the monthly volume compared to NASDAQ with 18.81%, while 45% of the volume
took place over-the-counter (OTC). In 2014, the NYSE had 22.47% of the monthly volume
compared to NASDAQ with 17% and 36.32% OTC. In 2013, the NYSE had 22.50% of the
monthly volume and NASDAQ had 18.78%, while 36.44% was done OTC. In October of 2012,
the NYSE had 24.00% of the monthly volume and NASDAQ had 20.76%, 32.92% was done
OTC. The percentages of the smaller exchanges are included in the chart. See id.
162. This analysis was compiled using FINRA ATS Transparency Data Quarterly Statistics.
See, e.g., ATS Transparency Data Quarterly Statistics, FIN. INDUS. REG. AUTHORITY,
KeLFv #++)-iTL '- ^*&K'e Vi)JQ' ;QM&Ii'K-. JKH
0.V,t*P01+ t1X P1 +V(V,tM Yt+V+ Qt(V 3P+,V.,V+V1*VX *QV 3t11V, P1 qQPYQ
*QVP, +o+*V3+ 0.V,t*VgLGJ
<0Xto 3)YQ 0T *QV !033P++P019+ T0Y)+ P1 *QV t,Vt 0T 3t,NV* ,VR)Mt*P01
,V3tP1+ RVt,VX *0qt,X P3.,0(P1R *QV Z[> T0, V-)P*o +VY),P*PV+g #+ t
st+VMP1V -)V+*P01 *QV !033P++P01 +Q0)MX Vpt3P1V qQV*QV, 0, 10* *QV
3t++P(V P1*V,(V1*P01 *Qt* P+ ,V-)P,VX *0 tYQPV(V *Qt* R0tM P+ qt,,t1*VXg B*QV,
.,0X)Y*+i +)YQ t+ TPpVX P1Y03V +VY),P*PV+i 0.*P01+i t1X XV,P(t*P(V+ 10q
Xqt,T *QV V-)P*PV+ 3t,NV*+g `+ P* 1VYV++t,o *0 XV(0*V +0 3)YQ t**V1*P01 *0 t
3t*),V 3t,NV* qQPMV 0*QV,+ R,0q t1X Y01*P1)V *0 XV(VM0.$ #M+0i P1 t1 tRV
Q**.CffqqqgTP1,tg0,RfP1X)+*,of0*Yft*+h*,t1+.t,V1YohXt*th-)t,*V,Moh+*t*P+*PY+ mMt+* (P+P*VX [t,g Gi
KeLFl& [K('-)KTiI Vi)JQ' ki'ii (&+)i 10*V LGeg <QV Xt*t P1YM)XV+ *q0 #<>+i <,tXVs00N t1X `d6i
*Qt* YVt+VX 0.V,t*P01+ X),P1R KeLGg 7QPMV *QV #<> Xt*t .)sMP+QVX so c`Z?# P+ T0, S#MM Z[>
>*0YN+i= *QV 3t,NV* (0M)3V Xt*t .)sMP+QVX so "#<> P+ T0, Y03sP1VX <t.V #i <t.V "i t1X <t.V !
(0M)3V so VpYQt1RV& t1o P1Y01R,)P*o sV*qVV1 *QV+V 3Vt+),V+ 3to tTTVY* *QV t1tMo+P+i *Q0)RQ `
sVMPV(V t1o +)YQ P3.tY* q0)MX sV +3tMMg #XXP*P01tMMoi *QP+ t1tMo+P+ Xt*t VpYM)XV+ t1o *,t1+tY*P01+
,V.0,*VX *0 *QV Z#>y#@i Zx>d <?ci 0, c`Z?# #yc *Qt* t,V VpVY)*VX VM+VqQV,V 0*QV, *Qt1 t1
#<> 0, d!Zg
LGJg <QV >d! Qt+ +V**MVX 1)3V,0)+ Yt+V+ tRtP1+* #<> t1X Xt,N .00M+ T0, 3P+MVtXP1R Y)+*03V,+
t1X 3P+)+P1R Y)+*03V, Xt*tg :QQb Q`M`i Z. ;Q AP.VMP1V <,tXP1R >o+*V3+i V*g tMgi LeK >d! y0YNV*
LeGK mBY*g KIi KeLLl mAP.VMP1V <,tXP1R >o+*V3+ \\! t1X *q0 0T P*+ *0. VpVY)*P(V+ qV,V YQt,RVX
qP*Q TtPMP1R *0 XP+YM0+V *0 Y)+*03V,+ 0T AP.VMP1V9+ SXt,N .00M= *,tXP1R .Mt*T0,3 *Qt* *QV (t+*
3tO0,P*o 0T 0,XV,+ qV,V TPMMVX so t *,tXP1R 0.V,t*P01 tTTPMPt*VX qP*Q AP.VMP1Vl& V"6 \\!i dpYQt1RV
#Y* ?VMVt+V Z0g GFiDGD& \P-)PX1V*i `1Yi dpYQt1RV #Y* ?VMVt+V Z0g FKiJJD m_)1V Gi KeLIl
mP3.,0.V, )+V 0T Y01TPXV1*PtM Y)+*03V, P1T0,3t*P01l& \t(tcM0qi `1Yi dpYQt1RV #Y* ?VMVt+V Z0g
FKiGFJ m_)Mo KHi KeLIl mTtPM),V *0 .,0*VY* Y01TPXV1*PtM +)s+Y,PsV, Xt*tgl& :"> >VY),P*PV+i \\!i
dpYQt1RV #Y* ?VMVt+V Z0g FIieGe m_t1g LHi KeLHl& `<b `Z!i dpYQt1RV #Y* ?VMVt+V Z0g FHiGFK
m#)Rg LKi KeLHl& !,VXP* >)P++V >VY),P*PV+ m:>#l \\! dpYQt1RV #Y* ?VMVt+V Z0g FFieeK m_t1g JLi
KeLGli "t,YMto+ !t.P*tM dpYQt1RV #Y* ?VMVt+V Z0g FFieeL m_t1g JLi KeLGlg
326 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. [Vol. 11
of globalization where worldwide markets are linked through technology, is
a national market system even a desirable goal?164
On a practical level, the management of the microstructure of market
operations is a far larger and more complicated task than overseeing the
regulatory market structure of those markets. As a result of the paradigm
shift after the 1975 Amendments, the Commission took on a primary role in
regulating equity market structure and a secondary role in the evolution of
the self-regulatory structure to police those markets. The distinction
between the two is an important one; somewhat like solving a linear
equation, it is necessary to balance both sides—that is, to ensure that the
initiatives on one side do not compromise the goals on the other. The
Micro-Intervention Paradigm exemplified in the Order Handling Rules,
Regulation NMS, and the equity market structure changes that they
established created a new set of issues that would need to be addressed by
even more Commission rules.
First, through its Micro-Intervention Paradigm, the Commission
broadly interpreted the mandate to facilitate the development of an NMS
and has inserted itself into almost every area of the securities industry. The
Commission now, directly or indirectly, regulates the dissemination of
market information, the length of time an exchange has to disseminate
information, the routing of broker dealer-orders, the routing of exchange
orders, quoting increments, and the prices charged for access to
quotations.165 Given the speed and complexity of the markets, does this role
continue to make sense, or are such matters best left to market forces? This
is especially important in light of the changes brought about by the 2008
financial crisis.
Now financial institutions, including most large broker-dealers, are
regulated by a mix of federal agencies from the Federal Reserve Board of
Governors, the Office of the Comptroller of Currency, the Commodity
Futures Trading Commission, and to some extent the Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau. Each of these has different mandates, some overlapping
jurisdiction, and is subject to bureaucratic turf wars. Can the Commission’s
approach under the Micro-Intervention Paradigm and the goals of federal
securities regulation be harmonized with those of bank supervisors, futures
regulators, and consumer advocates? With new registration requirements
and markets created by the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act of 2010, the Commission’s role in capital markets has
expanded and the SEC must therefore spend even more of its resources to
164. Dombalagian, supra note 110, at 79 (“The combined impact of demutualization and
globalization of markets will require greater reliance on comity and less reliance on domestic
rulemaking to achieve regulatory goals.”).
165. See generally ONNIG H. DOMBALAGIAN, CHASING THE TAPE: INFORMATION LAW AND
POLICY IN CAPITAL MARKETS (2015) (arguing that, historical classifications and regulation of
market information may not be effective in globalized markets).
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tinker with market microstructure. The Exchange Act, as proposed,
comprises only fourteen pages of the Congressional Record.166 One can
compare this with current Commission market structure rulemaking, which
is available on the Commission’s public web site.167 Although page count is
not an exact proxy for content, it illustrates the massive undertaking that the
Commission will continue to face if it does not reevaluate the efficacy of
the Micro-Intervention Paradigm. Finally, as the data above indicate, it is
not at all clear that the Commission’s approach is achieving the desired
results of greater transparency and order interaction.
Second, in order for the myriad Commission rules required under the
Micro-Intervention Paradigm to be credible, they need to be policed and
enforced. However, enforcement of complicated rules runs the risk of
achieving policy goals through enforcement settlements rather than through
thoughtful rulemaking. This may be problematic, as the agency has recast
itself “first and foremost” as law enforcement, rather than a regulatory
agency.168 Under the Self-Regulatory Paradigm, the relationship between
the industry and the SEC was designed to be more cooperative. As
Chairman Joseph P. Kennedy put it:
We want to see the wheels turn over and gather speed. We want to see the
security (sic) business, by far the greatest in volume and most important in
its effects of any in the country, go forward on a broad scale. To bring that
about we shall not sit as a prosecutor, hopeful of bringing in a verdict of
guilty. We shall seek to help all proper enterprises by helping them
establish new checks and setting up more positive standards. We believe
in affirmation, not negation. 169
Now, as then, the SEC has no criminal authority. Yet, the
Commission’s enforcement program is now modeled on a federal criminal
prosecutor’s office.170 Its strategies are defined by reference to criminal law
166. Stock Exchange Practices, supra note 56, at 3422–36; Exchange Act § 13, 15 U.S.C. § 77k
(2012). Thomas Corcoran put the number at 49 pages noting, “there is a great deal of technical
language in it relating to stock-exchange practices and to corporate practices, as there must be on
any subject of this kind.” Stock Exchange Practices, supra note 56, at 6465.
167. See, e.g., Regulation of NMS Stock Alternative Trading Systems, Exchange Act Release
No. 76,474 (Nov. 18, 2015) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 242 and 249).
168. How Investigations Work, SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov/News/Article/
Detail/Article/1356125787012 (last update Jan. 27, 2017).
169. Joseph P. Kennedy, Chairman, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Address at the National Press Club
(July 25, 1934).
170. See Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Names New Specialized Unit Chiefs and
Head of New Office of Market Intelligence (Jan. 13, 2010), https://www.sec.gov/news/press/2010/
2010-5.htm. These offices were referred to as “Specialized Prosecution Units.” See Press Release,
Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Enforcement Director Robert Khuzami to Leave SEC (Jan 9, 2013),
https://www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/Detail/PressRelease/1365171513652; see also J. Bradley
Bennett, White Collar Crime, Blue Collar Tactics: A Defense Lawyer’s Perspectives, 28 W. ST. U.
L. REV. 65 (2000) (providing a critique of aggressive criminal law approaches to white collar
defendants).
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theory.171 Its tools, such as cooperation agreements and deferred
prosecution agreements, are drawn from the criminal law.172 Even with a
more prosecutorial focus the Commission continues to be criticized for not
being aggressive enough.173 It may be that aggressive enforcement in areas
of market integrity, such as fraud, provides a higher benefit than
enforcement of the highly technical and sometimes vague rules required by
the Micro-Intervention Paradigm.174 Indeed, enforcement actions could have
the unintended consequence of decreasing confidence in the capital markets
and reinforcing a perception of unfairness.175
VI. PARADIGM REEVALUATED: TOWARD EQUITY MARKET
IMPROVEMENT
This Article began by identifying two controlling paradigms of federal
securities regulation—the Self-Regulatory Paradigm and the Micro-
Intervention Paradigm. This section examines some of the baseline
questions that should be addressed in considering whether or not the current
171. Mary Jo White, Chair, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Remarks at the Securities Enforcement
Forum (Oct. 9, 2013) (articulating the strategy of “Broken Windows” policing to the securities
markets, citing an article from The Atlantic titled Broken Windows).
172. See, e.g., Enforcement Cooperation Program, SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (Sep. 20, 2016),
http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/enfcoopinitiative.shtml.
173. The Enforcement Division has been criticized for being too aggressive for decades. See
generally ROBERTA S. KARMEL, REGULATION BY PROSECUTION: THE SECURITIES AND
EXCHANGE COMMISSION VS. CORPORATE AMERICA (1982). More recently, it has been criticized
for being too lenient. See Letter from Elizabeth Warren, Senator from Mass., to Mary Jo White,
Chair, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (June 2, 2015),
http://www.warren.senate.gov/files/documents/2015-6-2_Warren_letter_to_SEC.pdf. I am not
suggesting either extreme. Rather, as part of its equity structure review, the Commission should
examine the most effective use of enforcement remedies in non-fraud, non-scienter based market
operations cases.
174. The institutionalization of the Micro-Intervention paradigm is illustrated by the
Commission referring to violations of “SEC market structure rules.” Press Release, Sec. & Exch.
Comm’n, SEC Charges Three Individuals and Broker Dealer With Violating Market Structure
Rules (Dec. 16, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2016-266.html.
175. In September of 2012 the NYSE settled charges that it had violated Regulation NMS by
improperly distributing data to proprietary customer feeds prior to sending the same data to the
consolidated feeds. See In re N.Y. Stock Exch. LLC, & NYSE Euronext, Exchange Act Release
No. 67,857, 104 SEC Docket 2455 (Sept. 14, 2012). The Director of the SEC’s Division of
Enforcement emphasized that: “Improper early access to market data, even measured in
milliseconds, can in today’s markets be a real and substantial advantage that disproportionately
disadvantages retail and long-term investors.” Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 2012-189
(Sept. 14, 2012). However, the consolidated feeds mandated by the SEC take longer to process
data than private parties receiving the same data directly from exchanges. Thus, even if the data
had been released at the same instant, the consolidated tape data would have differed from the data
processed by private parties. The action seems to reinforce the importance of a SEC mandated
public data feed that the SEC concedes is inferior to other data feeds. See Mary Jo White, Chair,
Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Keynote Address at the Securities Traders Association: Equity Market
Structure in 2016 and for the Future n.13 (Sept. 14, 2016),
https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/white-equity-market-structure-2016-09-14.html [hereinafter
White STA 2016 Address].
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paradigm can be adjusted or whether a new one needs to be developed.
Thinking back to the Packard/Camaro dilemma, in engineering the national
market system, it is important to address not only modifications to the
existing system, but also whether or not there are more cost effective and
efficient alternatives available. As the Commission, through its Equity
Market Structure Advisory Committee, considers new improvements to the
NMS, it may very well be time to take a step back and examine whether the
operating assumptions embodied in the 1975 Amendments, including the
NMS mandate, are still applicable to twenty-first century markets. These
issues go far beyond the repeal of a specific rule or series of rules. Rather,
they go to what epistemological framework the SEC will use going
forward.
A.WHAT ARE FAIR ANDORDERLYMARKETS IN THETWENTY-FIRST
CENTURY?
The Commission is at an inflection point. On the one hand there is the
view held by many market professionals that the U.S. equity markets are
the most liquid, transparent, efficient, and competitive in the world.176
Spreads have decreased and transaction costs for individual trades have
plummeted. Regardless of the efficiency of the markets or the savings
resulting from lower spreads and transactions costs, it is possible that the
general perception is that equity markets are not fair. On May 6, 2010, the
exchange listed equity securities “experienced an extraordinarily rapid
decline and recovery.”177 The Dow Jones Industrial Average stock index
fell 1,000 points in less than 6 minutes—approximately 10 minutes later it
rose to previous levels.178 This “Flash Crash,” as it came to be known, was
an example of the ability of the system to withstand large volumes at record
speeds and continue trading in an efficient manner. For the general public,
however, it was hard to reconcile how such a dramatic drop and recovery
reflected a robust price discovery mechanism. It seemed that the equity
markets had become more of a casino than a long-term investment
choice.179 This is significant because, as shown in the historic overview,
fairness to the trading public, rather than trading efficiency, has been a
176. The Role of Regulation in Shaping Equity Market Structure and Electronic Trading:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous. & Urban Affairs, 113th Cong. 2 (2014)
(testimony of Joe Ratterman).
177. U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N & SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, FINDINGS
REGARDING THE MARKET EVENTS OF MAY 6, 2010: REPORT OF THE STAFFS OF THE CFTC AND
SEC TO THE JOINT ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON EMERGING REGULATORY ISSUES 4 (2010),
https://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2010/marketevents-report.pdf.
178. Graham Bowley, U.S. Markets Plunge, Then Stage a Rebound, N.Y. TIMES (May 6, 2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/07/business/07markets.html.
179. Brandon Keim, Nanosecond Trading Could Make Markets Go Haywire, WIRED (Feb. 16,
2012, 6:30 AM), https://www.wired.com/2012/02/high-speed-trading/.
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primary motivation for the federal regulatory framework. This was true in
1906, 1912, and 1932. It is true today as well.
A good example of the emphasis on fairness was the public’s reaction
to Michael Lewis’s book, Flash Boys.180 The book documents the practices
that exchanges and broker-dealers have adopted to comply with Regulation
NMS. It describes a market where professional traders have a distinct
advantage over ordinary investors because they invest in technology that
allows them to execute trades at blinding speed. There was nothing
surprising about the revelations in the book. Exchange rules are reviewed
and approved by the Commission, and market participants simply reacted to
the incentives inherent in the order routing requirements of Regulation
NMS. One of the primary subjects of Lewis’s book is so called high
frequency trading (HFT). In general, HFT is the ability to use technology to
reach posted quotations without human intervention. It is quite possible that
a consequence of the Order Handling Rules and Regulation NMS has been
the lack of discretion given to market participants in accessing quotations.
Thus, entities with better technology can reach desirable quotes faster than
the general public.
Much as the market participants in the twentieth century (as
documented in the Hughes, Pujo, and Pecora Reports), today’s HFT traders
possess an informational advantage that they exploit for their benefit. In
some cases they can process information faster than exchanges and thereby
trade in anticipation of changes on an exchange market. It is hard to
quantify the benefits and costs of this activity, but there are arguments on
both sides.181 The last SEC Chair has conceded the problem inherent in
reconciling market efficiency with the more subjective notion of fairness.182
Lewis documented the manner in which the NMS, constructed under
the Micro-Intervention Paradigm, functions. His conclusion and the
conclusion of many others was that the system was “rigged” against
ordinary investors.183 Like the so-called robber barons of the late nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries, HFT traders have been pilloried not for
violating the law so much as offending the public’s sense of fairness.184
180. MICHAEL LEWIS, FLASHBOYS: AWALL STREET REVOLT (2014).
181. See Steven R. McNamara, The Law and Ethics of High Speed Trading, 17 MINN. J.L. SCI.
& TECH. 71, 127–33 (2016).
182. “One of the most difficult tasks in developing the right regulatory response to such
potentially disruptive trading strategies is the need to avoid undue interference with practices that
benefit investors and market efficiency.” White STA 2016 Address, supra note 175.
183. Jared Meyer, Regulators Protect High Frequency Traders, Ignore Investors, FORBES (Feb.
23, 2016, 7:16 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/jaredmeyer/2016/02/23/sec-should-stand-up-
for-small-investors/#695d32603a30; see also Bradley Hope, Dick Grasso: Today’s Markets
Aren’t Fair, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 11, 2015, 7:36 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/fast-market-
not-necessarily-a-fair-market-former-nyse-chief-says-1441992084.
184. See generally Conflicts of Interest, Investor Loss of Confidence and High Speed Trading in
U.S. Stock Markets: Hearing Before the Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations of the S. Comm.
on Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs, 113th Cong. 2 (2014).
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Much as Upton Sinclair had done for the meat packing industry and
Brandeis for banking, Lewis revealed the mechanics of an industry that
seemed to ignore the public it purported to serve. Thus, in spite of the
interventions made after the 1975 Amendments, in many ways the entire
market structure regulatory journey has brought matters right back to where
they began.
B.WHAT IS THEROLE OF AN EXCHANGE?
The exchanges have a very specific role under the Exchange Act;
however, that role has eroded over time. Do they continue to be relevant?
Since the Commission adopted Regulation ATS, the number of national
securities exchanges has increased. While in 1998 there were nine
exchanges (equities and options) in operation,185 today there are twenty-one
registered equities and options exchanges.186 At the same time, technology
and innovations such as co-location, sponsored access, and the availability
of exchange data feeds, allows non-exchanges to compete directly with
exchanges, without assuming the responsibilities, obligations, and costs of
an exchange.187 The proliferation of exchanges is the result of three factors.
First, the ability of an exchange to outsource regulation makes it possible to
operate an exchange without actually performing self-regulatory functions;
this limits upfront investment costs and the need to hire experienced
regulatory staff. Second, the desire of exchanges to charge differing fees to
their customers may require that they register additional exchange
platforms. Under current staff interpretation, charging different fees to
similarly situated customers could be deemed discriminatory (and therefore
violate § 6 of the Exchange Act), were they charged by one exchange.188
185. This number includes NASDAQ, which in 1998 was not a registered exchange but a
quotation service run by the NASD. Nevertheless, given its status as a competitor to the NYSE in
1998, I have included it here.
186. Self-Regulatory Organization Rulemaking, SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov/
rules/sro.shtml (last visited Feb. 22, 2017).
187. GOLDMAN SACHS, MARKET STRUCTURE OVERVIEW (2009), http://www.goldmansachs.
com/our-thinking/archive/mkt-structure.pdf (Sponsored access refers to broker–dealers who allow
customers to access to the markets using the broker dealers market participant identifier.); see also
Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Adopts New Rule Preventing Unfiltered Market
Access (Nov. 3, 2010), https://www.sec.gov/news/press/2010/2010-210.htm. Co-location is the
ability of exchange customers to put computer servers closer to an exchange-matching engine,
reducing the latency of data transmission. Concept Release on Equity Market Structure, Proposed
Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 3594, 3598 (Jan. 21, 2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 242). Finally,
exchanges often offer individual data feeds that deliver quotations directly to customers,
bypassing the Commission mandated data feeds. Concept Release on Equity Market Structure,
Proposed Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. at 3598.
188. This is apparently based on a Staff interpretation. The Commission has approved rules that
allow exchanges to offer volume discounts to firms. See, e.g., NASDAQ RULE 7018. It is hard to
see why operating a different exchange with the same technology is any different from allowing
exchanges to have fully disclosed prices. The question of whether the charging of different prices
to different subscribers would be, in fact, unfair discrimination has not been addressed by the
Commission.
332 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. [Vol. 11
This has led many exchanges to register a second or third exchange where a
different pricing structure is used, even though the exchange is otherwise
identical to the first.189 Third, the ability to display a protected quote gives
exchanges an incentive to have multiple venues in which to display order
interest. With more exchange platforms a complex has a greater chance of
displaying a protected quote and attaching interest.190
Critical evaluation of exchanges is complicated by the lack of objective
standards required of them and the lack of objective criteria for approving
or disapproving exchange applications.191 Since 2000, eleven new
exchanges have been approved.192 There is no record of the SEC rejecting
any application. Indeed, as the recent approval of the IEX exchange
application shows, lacking any standards the Commission writes
governance, regulatory, and trading system standards into its Approval
Orders. As the IEX Order illustrates, this requires the Commission to opine
on the smallest aspects of the operation of an entity’s trading system, while
providing only minimal discussion of its regulatory abilities.193 Finally,
there are no real barriers to transferring exchange registrations to other
market participants. Thus, unsuccessful exchanges, whether operating or
not, can be added to the portfolio of existing exchanges.194
189. Several exchange “complexes” consist of more than two equity exchanges. NASDAQ
OMX operates six. CBOE operates two and has announced plans to merge with BATS Global
Markets, which operates, four ICE, which owns NYSE, NYSE MKT, and NYSE Arca Equities,
operates three equity exchanges and has acquired a fourth. See infra, note 194 MIAX operates two
equity exchanges.. This staff interpretation of the Exchange Act has creates something of a
paradox; it encourages greater fragmentation in the marketplace, and it strains inspection and
surveillance resources of both the SROs and the Commission.
190. There may also be an additional incentive to operate multiple platforms steaming from the
1975 Act amendments. After the amendments, the Commission used its authority to require
exchanges to participate in National Market System Plans. The governance of such plans
generally assigns one vote to each SRO. Those complexes with multiple registered platform
therefore get more votes. National Market System plans are posted on each member’s website.
See, e.g., National Market System Plans, FIN. INDUS. REG. AUTHORITY,
http://www.finra.org/industry/national-market-system-plans (last visited Apr. 2, 2017).
191. Despite that reviewing applications for exchange status and ongoing rule filings consumes
a considerable amount of staff time, there are no filing fees for registering a new exchange, and
there are no fees associated with the filing of proposed rule changes.
192. See Fast Answers: Exchanges, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov/
divisions/marketreg/mrexchanges.shtml (last visited Feb. 22, 2017).
193. In re Investors’ Exchange, LLC., Exchange Act Release No. 78,101, 2016 WL 34401944
(June 17, 2016).
194. In 2011 while announcing the acquisition of the National Securities Exchange the
Chairman and CEO of the Chicago Board Options Exchanges referred to an exchange registration
as a “medallion,” analogizing to taxi cab regulation. CBOE Stock Exchange to Acquire National
Stock Exchange, GLOBAL CUSTODIAN, http://www.globalcustodian.com/Market-
Infrastructure/CBOE-Stock-Exchange-to-Acquire-National-Stock-Exchange/ (last visited Apr. 1,
2017). Five years later, the same exchange registration was acquired by the New York Stock
Exchange. Alexander Osipovitch, NYSE Deal for National Stock Exchange May Fuel New
Trading Approaches, WALL. ST. J. (Dec 14, 2016), http://www.wsj.com/articles/nyse-to-buy-
national-stock-exchange-1481728998?mg=id-wsj (emphasis added).
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The Commission should consider whether or not to adopt substantive
standards for exchange registration. For example, exchanges are required to
provide, and therefore fund, regulation (whether they outsource it or not),
monitor markets, participate in NMS plans, discipline their members, and
comply with the federal securities laws. Given these responsibilities it
might make sense to require exchanges and applicants for exchange status
to meet minimum financial standards.195 Here, the Commission needs to
balance the barriers to entry imposed by such standards with the goal of
ensuring safe, fair, and efficient capital markets. Without such standards
there is no guarantee that potential exchanges can afford to perform the
functions they are required to.
Lack of financial means could also compromise the Commission’s
ability to discipline exchanges. For example, Facebook was one of the most
anticipated IPOs in some time. However, a design limitation in NASDAQ’s
system to match the IPO buy and sell orders caused disruption of the IPO.
NASDAQ officials decided not to delay the start of secondary trading,
believing they had fixed the system limitation by removing some lines of
computer code. However, the cause of the problem had not been fixed, and
more than 30,000 Facebook orders remained stuck in NASDAQ’s system
for more than two hours when they should have been executed or
cancelled.196 This caused several rule violations by NASDAQ, which were
compounded when NASDAQ assumed a short position in Facebook of
more than three million shares in an error account and liquidated the short
position for a profit of about $10.8 million in violation of its rules. The
Commission’s settlement order found that NASDAQ violated § 19(h)(1) of
the Exchange Act and imposed a $10 million penalty.197 It was in a
financial position to pay that penalty, but other registered exchanges may
not be.
195. Many businesses require some level of capitalization. For example, McDonald’s, a
business that does not materially impact the U.S. financial system, requires an initial down
payment of 40% of the total cost to purchase a new restaurant or 25% of the total cost of an
existing restaurant. The down payment must come from non-borrowed personal resources, which
include cash on hand; securities, bonds, and debentures; vested profit sharing (net of taxes); and
business or real estate equity, exclusive of a personal residence. Generally, McDonald’s requires a
minimum of $500,000 of non-borrowed personal resources to consider an individual for a
franchise. Additional funds may be required of individuals seeking additional or multi-restaurant
opportunities, and the cost may be considerably higher depending on location. There are also
additional fees and costs, such as rent. See Acquiring a Franchise, MCDONALDS,
http://corporate.mcdonalds.com/content/mcd/franch
ising/us_franchising/acquiring_a_franchise.html (last visited Mar. 3, 2017). In contrast, there are
no minimum capital requirements for either operating a national securities exchange or for
acquiring an existing exchange registration.
196. Julianne Pepitone, Facebook IPO: What the %$#! Happened?, CNN MONEY (May 23,
2012, 6:06 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2012/05/23/technology/facebook-ipo-what-went-wrong/.
197. In re NASDAQ Stock Mkt., Exchange Act Release No. 69,655, 106 SEC Docket 1774
(May 29, 2013).
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Finally, the Commission should consider whether or not exchange
registrations are freely transferable. The registration requirements of § 6 of
the Exchange Act seem to apply to the entity seeking registration and do not
contain a provision for transfer. It may not be wise for the Commission to
register additional entities that may ultimately be sold to others or even
foreign interests, without articulating substantive standards regarding such
transfers.
C. IS SELF-REGULATION STILLVIABLE?
More than twenty years after the NASD 21(a) Report, market events
have illustrated the difficulty in reconciling the inherent conflict between
business and regulation. In private litigation resulting from the Facebook
IPO, the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York
pointed to some of the results of converging lines of business and
regulation. The facts discussed in the Commission’s Order concerning the
NASDAQ Facebook IPO and the facts outlined in the decision by Judge
Sweet in the NASDAQ Facebook class action lawsuit198 give a clear picture
of the dilemmas NASDAQ faced in determining the appropriate role of
regulatory staff during this business crisis. As Judge Sweet stated in his
opinion, “NASDAQ OMX [which is not in fact the SRO – but is the
unregistered parent of the NASDAQ Stock Market] competed aggressively
with the NYSE for the Facebook IPO…To secure the IPO, Defendants
shortened from two years to three months the ‘seasoning’ period usually
required for inclusion in the NASDAQ 100 Index.”199 Judge Sweet also
pointed out the numerous positive statements NASDAQ made regarding its
trading platforms and technology to induce Facebook to choose to list on its
exchange: “As exchanges have evolved into for-profit enterprises, an
irreconcilable conflict has arisen, rendering independence unattainable in
the context of an exchange regulating its own, for-profit business
conduct.”200 These conflicts have existed since the passage of the Exchange
Act. The Commission acknowledged them in its Self-Regulation Concept
Release.201
The Commission has reinforced the concept of separation of regulation
and market functions. In a private securities action stemming in part from
the facts discussed in Flash Boys, the Commission filed an amicus curiae
brief addressing in part whether or not SROs enjoyed complete immunity.
The Commission noted that, “when an exchange is operating its own
198. Id.; See also, In re Facebook, Inc., IPO Securities and Derivative Litigation, 12-md-02384,
U.S. District Court, Southern District of New York.
199. In re Facebook, Inc., IPO Sec. & Derivative Litig., 288 F.R.D. 26 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
200. Id. at 44.
201. See Fair Administration and Governance of Self-Regulatory Organizations, 69 Fed. Reg.
71,255 (Dec. 8, 2004) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 242 and 249). Inherent Conflicts with
Members, Market Operations, Issuers, and Shareholders.
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market and engaging in its own conduct pursuant to Commission
regulation, it is acting as a regulated entity—not a regulator of others.”202
While this analysis is in the context of private litigation action, the general
principle seems to be that although exchange market rules are reviewed and
approved by the Commission for consistency with the Exchange Act, and in
many cases result from Commission requirements such as Regulation ATS
or Regulation NMS, the Commission does not view these as within the
purview of an exchange regulatory mandate. If the Commission believes
that market operation is not part of the self-regulatory function, then there is
even less of an incentive to operate as an SRO.
It is important to keep in mind that in this analysis, the Micro-
Intervention Paradigm has deemphasized the self-regulatory function as
articulated in the Exchange Act. So, for example, although performing self-
regulatory functions has been a sine qua non of exchange status since the
passage of the Exchange Act,203 most exchanges contract some or all of
their regulatory programs through so called regulatory service agreements
(RSAs). The reliance on RSAs means that many of the newer exchanges
have never actually engaged in self-regulatory functions. Rather, an RSA
vendor, usually the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA), has
always provided regulatory services for these exchanges.204 Without a self-
regulatory apparatus, exchanges may focus almost exclusively on business
functions, have formalistic oversight of the RSA provider, lack internal
regulatory knowledge, and consequently have difficulty performing
regulatory functions for which they are responsible. The exchanges also see
each other primarily as competitors, rather than collaborators, making it
more difficult to achieve common ground in the regulatory space, where
cooperation is essential. When exchanges are permitted to contract out their
202. Brief of the SEC as amicus curiae, at 30, City of Providence, et al v. Bats Global Markets
Inc, et al., (2d Cir. Nov. 28, 2016), (No. 15-3057).
203. See Fair Administration and Governance of Self-Regulatory Organizations, 69 Fed. Reg.
71,255 (“The Markets recognize the special roles and responsibilities that marketplace self-
regulatory organizations . . . have in the U.S. economy. Each Market helps ensure that U.S.
financial markets are the most respected in the world and that each Market has the special duty to
ensure the integrity of its respective market for the benefit of investors and issuers and others
participating in the U.S. markets. Each Market also recognizes its responsibilities to enforce its
members’ compliance with its own rules as well as with the …1934 Act and the Commission’s
rules. The Markets accept these special roles with the utmost seriousness. The Markets recognize
the great responsibility placed on the Commission in an era of fast-paced changes in the nature,
scope, and importance of the financial markets and, therefore, fully appreciate the Commission’s
efforts. As a result, the Markets support the Commission’s efforts to ensure that SROs have
effective compliance programs that are consistent with their self- regulatory responsibilities.”).
204. CBOE has ceased providing regulatory services for other exchanges and has negotiated
with FINRA to provide it with regulatory services. Tom Polansek, CBOE to Pass Regulatory
Duties to FINRA, REUTERS MKT. NEWS (Dec. 22, 2014, 1:12 PM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/cboe-regulation-finra-idUSL1N0U619320141222. As of the end of
2016, FINRA is the only regulatory service provider, although as noted herein NYSE has
reassumed much of its self-regulation.
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regulatory responsibilities, they are effectively giving up what sets them
apart from ATSs in a way that is not entirely transparent to the investing
public. 205
If the Commission wishes to have robust self-regulation, it must
perform a critical evaluation of the role of the modern SRO and provide
clarity regarding the duties of exchanges or any entity performing a specific
regulatory task. Such review could include: the effects of loss of control by
the exchange, including an erosion of market-specific expertise and
reduction of direct interaction with its market; issues arising from using a
single RSA provider, including in particular a lack of choice in providers of
regulatory services; and conflicts between the SRO and the RSA provider
(which can include pressure to conform to criteria set by the RSA provider),
and the inherent financial conflicts between profit-driven SROs that want to
lower costs and RSA providers that seek to increase revenue. Currently,
virtually all of the exchanges have contracted out some of their regulatory
obligations.206 The Commission should consider whether or not it can
achieve positive results by (as the Securities Act and Exchange Act do)
recognizing and incentivizing the performance of regulatory functions,
rather than further removing market operations from self-regulatory
responsibilities.
For example, while brokers are bound by their duty of best execution,
quality of regulation is not emphasized.207 The Commission could use this
205. For example, Flash Boys repeatedly describes IEX as an “exchange.” At the time IEX was
an ATS, a registered broker-dealer, and was exempt from the definition of exchange. While such
distinctions are not obvious to the investing public, they have legal implications under the federal
securities laws.
206. As noted, the NYSE complex has reassumed self-regulation.
207. Generally, broker dealer routing decisions had been governed by their obligation to obtain
“best execution” for customer orders, which is the obligation to obtain the best terms reasonably
available for the transaction. The concept of best execution is codified in FINRA RULE 5310. The
Commission does not have a best execution rule, however, it enforces this duty under Rule 10b-5
(17 C.F.R. 10b-5) as a fraud. The Commission has brought a number of cases invoking this
requirement against both broker-dealers and investment advisers. See, e.g., In re Gavornik,
Mariniello, & Argus, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 3927 (Nov. 24, 2014) (adviser
arranged for clients to execute at higher commission rates); In re Strategic Capital Group, LLC,
Investment Advisors Act Release No. 3924 (Sept. 18, 2014) (firm failed to seek best execution
through its affiliated broker-dealer); In re Manarin Investment Counsel, Ltd., et al., Investment
Advisers Act Release No. 3986 (Oct. 2, 2013) (adviser breached fiduciary duty by causing funds
to buys certain shares of mutual funds, even when the funds were eligible to own lower cost
share); In re G-Trade Services, LLC, et al., Exchange Act Release No. 71,128 (Dec. 18, 2013)
(broker-dealer routed orders to offshore affiliate in order to charge undisclosed mark-ups and
mark-downs); In re Goelzer Investment Management Inc., Investment Advisers Act Release No.
3638 (July 31, 2013) (adviser failed to perform best execution analysis before recommending
itself to customers); In re A.R. Schmeidler & Co., Investment Advisers Act Release No. 3637
(July 31, 2013) (adviser breached fiduciary duty by failing to seek best execution for clients); In re
Tilden Loucks & Woodnorth, LLC, et al., Exchange Act Release No 68,118 (Oct. 29, 2012)
(adviser charged increased commissions on trades for its clients through an affiliated broker-
dealer); In re BNY Mellon Securities, LLC, Exchange Act Release No. 63,724 (Jan. 14, 2011)
(BNY failed to meet its duty of best execution with various employee stock plans); In re
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to provide an incentive to perform regulatory duties, by establishing
standards and metrics around self-regulatory processes. This would allow
the concept of best execution to include a component considering the
quality of regulation at a given venue. There are other areas where the
Commission can provide incentives to perform effective regulation.
Notably, many of the exchanges currently registered with the Commission
do not perform a primary regulatory function of exchanges—namely, listing
securities. This could be another incentive to encourage core exchange
functions. For example, the Commission might limit the listing of securities
to exchanges that perform regulatory functions. It could also grant a period
of exclusive listing for exchanges that bring new companies to market.
Under §12(f) of the Exchange Act, the Commission has the authority to
prescribe, by rule or regulation, the duration of the interval for exclusive
trading privileges.208 Either case would require the Commission to
reevaluate its Micro-Intervention Paradigm.
D. IF SELF- REGULATIONCONTINUES, SHOULD THERE BE A
“UNIVERSAL INDUSTRY SELF-REGULATOR”?
The Commission presented this alternative in its 2004 concept release
on self-regulation.209 We have some experience with the single regulator
model in practice. With the blessing of Regulation ATS, many exchanges
have outsourced their regulatory functions. With little competition in this
area, FINRA has evolved into the default option for regulatory service
contracts.210 Since the Commission has never set standards for what those
contracts should include or how they should be administered and overseen,
the Commission runs the risk that FINRA will become the standard setter
for an area that had been uniquely within the SEC’s jurisdiction. In a
parallel to the Commission’s approach to the NASD after the 21(a) Report,
the Commission might cede SRO standards for FINRA to establish. This
may be the appropriate approach; a single regulator might avoid duplication
and lower compliance costs. Of course there would be immense pressures
Scottrade, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 58,012 (Jun. 24, 2008) (broker-dealer failed to conduct
rigorous review of execution quality); In re Folger Nolan Fleming Douglas Capital Management,
Inc., Investment Advisers Act Release No. 2639 (Aug. 23, 2007) (adviser failed to disclose that
commission rates were twice as high for direct trades compared to non-directed trades); In re
Instinet, LLC, Exchange Act Release No 52,623 (Oct. 18, 2015) (broker-dealer failed to
adequately test automated systems); In re Knight Securities, LP, Exchange Act Release No.
50,867 (Dec. 16, 2004) (Knight violated its best execution obligation by extracting excessive
profits out of certain orders).
208. Exchange Act § 12(f), 15 U.S.C. § 78l (2012).
209. See Fair Administration and Governance of Self-Regulatory Organizations, 69 Fed. Reg.
71,255, 71,280–82 (Dec. 8, 2004) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 242 and 249).
210. I use FINRA as an example because it is the primary provider of regulatory services and
therefore has many of the characteristics of a universal self-regulator. This is not a criticism of
FINRA’s operations; rather it is an illustration of the conflicts that need to be managed under the
Micro-Intervention Paradigm.
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on trading venues to conform their structure to any regulator’s existing
systems. Similarly, in attempting to dictate norms to allow for more
standardization in surveillance and enforcement, a service provider may
inadvertently frustrate innovation and competition.
On the other hand, it is not clear that FINRA is the logical choice for
such duties. It describes itself on its website as “an independent, not for
profit organization authorized by Congress to protect America’s investors
by making sure the securities industry operates fairly and honestly.”211 It
goes on to say, “[o]ur independent regulation plays a critical role in
America’s financial system—by enforcing high ethical standards, bringing
the necessary resources and expertise to regulation and enhancing investor
safeguards and market integrity—all at no cost to taxpayers.”212
In my analysis of FINRA, it is not at all clear that FINRA can support
this claim of independence; it has members and is supported by member
fees, it is required by statute to give its members representation, it is a
participant in the NMS, it operates a quotation, reporting, and comparison
system called the Alternative Display Facility, it operates and charges for
Trade Reporting services through a Trade Reporting Facility, it is a voting
member of all NMS plans, it sells market data, it conducts disciplinary
proceedings, and it collects fines from members for violations of its rules.213
It thus performs the same functions as any other SRO, whether affiliated
with an exchange or not. Finally, while it has the same conflicts as other
SROs, it has a unique additional conflict in its role as a regulatory service
provider for client exchanges. In my view its claim of independence is
marginal.
On the issue of effectiveness, there is no public SEC or independent
evaluation of FINRA as a vendor of regulatory services. There is no
evidence that FINRA has any expertise in the operation and regulation of
complicated market centers for which it monitors and for which it performs
regulatory services. There is no public determination that FINRA has
effectively mitigated the conflict that arises from its dual role as a vendor of
regulation for exchanges, its operation of its own proprietary display
facility, and its responsibility to regulate broker-dealers. These conflicts
were at the heart of the Rudman Report. The Maloney Act neither
211. About FINRA, FIN. INDUS. REG. AUTHORITY, http://www.finra.org/about (last visited Mar.
3, 2017).
212. Id.
213. See Remarks of Robert W. Cook, Fin. Indus. Reg. Authority, President & CEO, SIFMA
Compliance and Legal Society (Jan. 10, 2016) (describing among other things, member
representation on the FINRA Board and member engagement in the rule making process). The
Trade Reporting Facility is described on the FINRA web-site, http://www.finra.org/industry/trade-
reporting-facility-trf. The Alternative Display Facility is described on same web-site
http://www.finra.org/industry/adf. Revenues from the Alternative Display Facility and market data
fees are accounted for as Transparency Services Revenue, FINRA Annual Report 2015, at 45. In
2015, FINRA posted an operating lost equal to approximately 4% of revenues. See FINRA
ANNUALREPORT 2015, at 9.
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authorizes nor suggests that FINRA has statutory authority to conduct
investigations, enforcement, and surveillance on behalf of other SROs by
contract.214 There are no Commission rules setting standards for what is
required in an RSA, how the effectiveness of an RSA will be measured, or
how an RSA should be overseen by a third party. FINRA, like many SROs,
also has been disciplined by the SEC.215 Even outside commenters have
questioned the structure and governance of FINRA.216 Finally, while
FINRA expands its regulatory reach into the listed equity markets, its
statutory mission remains rooted in the regulation of the over-the-counter
markets. Recent research suggests that these markets pose specific risks to
retail investors.217
Thus, while a single regulator model has been encouraged (whether
consciously or not) by SEC rules and the Commission’s desire to separate
market operations from regulatory functions, it is not at all clear that it is
the best policy approach or, if it is, that FINRA is the best candidate for that
role. If the ultimate goal is to have a single regulator, it should be done
pursuant to statute and with transparency, rather than as an afterthought. It
requires an examination of whether or not the governance structures
suggested by the Rudman Report have resulted in better conflict mitigation
and it should include an examination of the new conflicts and conflict
mitigation strategies that have arisen as a result of the changing roles and
structures of SROs.
CONCLUSION
The changes in the equities marketplace over the last eight decades
have been profound. The explosion of innovation and competition in the
financial industry has strained the Commission’s ability to produce useful,
understandable, and enforceable rules to govern the financial markets. The
actions of the Commission are in no small part related to the paradigm it
214. But see 17 C.F.R. § 240.17d-2 (2017) (granting authority for SROs to allocate
responsibilities among themselves, subject to approval by the Commission).
215. ). The Commission has brought a settled cease and desist proceeding against FINRA for
altering documents requested by SEC examiners. Such alterations took place on three separate
occasions. Order Instituting Administrative and Cease-and-Desist Proceedings Pursuant to Section
21C Of The Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, Making Findings and Imposing Sanctions And
A Cease-And-Desist Order, In re FINRA, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 65,643, 102 SEC
Docket 1148 (Oct. 27, 2011).
216. Hester Pierce, The Financial Industry Regulatory Authority: Not Self-Regulatory After All
(Mercatus Working Paper Jan. 2015) (analyzing the historical development of FINRA and arguing
that FINRA lacks accountability).
217. See, e.g., Joshua T. White, Outcomes of Investing in OTC Stocks, SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N
DIVISION OF ECON. & RISK ANALYSIS (Dec. 16, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/files/White_
OutcomesOTCinvesting.pdf (White Paper from the Commission’s Division of Economic and Risk
Analysis highlighting the asymmetric outcomes of retail investors in listed securities and OTC
securities). Costs associated with activities not required by the Exchange Act may also strain
FINRA financial resources. In 2015, FINRA posted an operating loss equal to approximately 4%
of revenues. See FINRA ANNUAL REPORT 2015, at 9.
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adopts in its analysis. Different paradigms emphasize different approaches
and produce different results. The current paradigm has resulted in the
promulgation of many regulations while the market regulatory structure
supporting those changes has evolved largely undirected.
The SEC must be able to lead a dynamic marketplace. However, when
it tries to do too much, when its approach to rule making takes too long, and
when its regulations are too complicated, it is not effective. As the first SEC
Chairman Joseph P. Kennedy put it:
The regulations generally are broad in character and rest squarely upon the
principles of ethics applicable not only to business but to everyday life.
The success of the regulations will depend in part upon the wisdom with
which we of the Securities and Exchange Commission apply them, but,
even more, the success will rest upon the manner in which they are
accepted.218
The Commission’s current approach is both extremely ambitious and
firmly embedded in the Micro-Intervention Paradigm. As Chair Mary Jo
White has said: “. . . working on market structure means never saying ‘good
enough’—the job is unceasing.”219 The question is whether the statute
requires unceasing intervention, or whether the Commission’s approach to
the statute has created the need for unceasing intervention. It may be that in
search of a unified theory of a national market system, the Commission has
over extended itself, has gone a bridge too far. Matters may be at a point
where a new regulatory paradigm needs to emerge. A different approach
might revitalize some aspects of the Self-Regulatory Paradigm, perhaps
deferring more to markets and SROs and providing incentives for robust
regulation.
As Kuhn noted, “the proponents of competing paradigms practice their
trades in different worlds.”220 Paradigm change will thus require the
industry, Congress, and the SEC to challenge many of the assumptions that
they have accepted since 1975. A critical evaluation will require the small
and self-selecting group of securities regulators and practitioners to
reevaluate their accomplishments and decide whether or not to take a
different road forward. Just as the Packard may be to the point where it
cannot be improved through retrofits, the Commission must decide whether
or not the benefits of its continued interventions in equity markets will
result in diminishing marginal returns. History tells us that reevaluating
long accepted practices is difficult. However, the consequences of not doing
so can be catastrophic.221 Ultimately, any new approach must make a
218. Kennedy, supra note 169, at 3.
219. SeeWhite STA 2016 Address, supra note 175.
220. See KUHN, supra note 6, at 19.
221. See, e.g., Gonzalo Alvarez, Francisco C. Ceballos & Celsa Quinteiro, The Role of
Inbreeding in the Extinction of a European Royal Dynasty, PLOS ONE, April 2009, at 1.
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critical examination of the costs and benefits of continuing to “improve” the
Packard or to finally trade it in for a Camaro.
